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Abstract 
This research explored implementing a best commercial practice of establishing 
strategic purchasing relationships within the Department of Defense (DOD) procurement 
environment. The research was sparked by Air Force Material Command's (AFMC) 
instituting a commercial style acquisition strategy using an award term incentive on 
several programs. The award term incentive provides for extensions or reductions to the 
term of the contract based on contractors' level of performance. Forthcoming 
implementation of Air Force FAR supplement 5317.7X, Incentive Term Extension, will 
likely increase the number of acquisitions using an award term incentive. 
Research findings indicate that management should consider expanding the 
AFMC award term guidance to include the model developed from this research, which 
identifies decision criteria for selecting the award term incentive strategic purchasing 
method. Findings indicate that the acquisition professionals may not have the expertise 
or related purchasing skills necessary to establish strategic purchasing relationships for 
commercial type performance based services and that training is needed. The researcher 
also uncovered evidence that instability and reductions in the DOD workforce affects 
acquisition professionals' ability to maintain currency with the changing legal 
environment. Further, workforce instability and reductions may influence the 
implementation of strategic contractual relationships. The research concludes that 
implementing the award term incentive affects the DOD competitive market. 
AWARD TERM INCENTIVE CONTRACTING: AN INVESTIGATION OF 
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE STRATEGIC PURCHASING 
I. Introduction 
As a foundation for strategic purchasing, this chapter describes budget constraints, 
workforce reductions, and acquisition reform initiatives. The new award term incentive 
contracting strategy is introduced as well as the traditional method of establishing long- 
term purchasing relationships. A commercial supplier relationship model and a 
conceptual award term incentive model are presented. The research problem, objectives, 
questions, and methodology are identified. Finally, the scope and the limitations of the 
research are defined. 
The Acquisition Environment 
Budget Environment. Between 1974 and 1997, the federal government 
continually spent more money than it collected. By 1997, the federal deficit was $288 
billion, and the total cumulative debt had reached an estimated $5.4 trillion. (OMB, 
1999:7) Politicians calling for a balanced budget saw decisive election victories in 1994. 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the 
Cold War fueled the quest for Department of Defense (DOD) budget reductions as 
Congress searched for the elusive peace dividend. 
The newly elected Congress targeted defense, the largest category of discretionary 
spending in the federal budget, in its advancement toward a balanced budget. Congress 
enacted the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA). This act was designed to limit discretionary 
spending while ensuring that any new entitlement programs or tax cuts did not make the 
deficit worse. The factors below resulted in more tax revenue available to reduce the 
deficit. 
• The BEA set annual limits on total discretionary spending for defense, 
international affairs, and domestic programs. 
• The BEA created "pay-as-you-go" rules for entitlements and taxes: those who 
proposed new spending on entitlements or lower taxes were forced to offset 
the costs by cutting other entitlements or raising other taxes (OMB, 1999:10). 
The DOD has been coping with declining budgets, both in nominal and real terms for 
more than a decade. Defense procurement spending dropped an inflation-adjusted 67% 
between 1987 and 1995 (Pare, 1994:96). 
Workforce Reductions. Due to the resulting budget constraints between 1993 
and 2000, the defense workforce was significantly reduced. The military force structure 
was reduced by 29.9% from 936,731 to 656,883. DOD civilian force structure has 
decline by 29.4% from 966,087 to 682,286.   During the same time, the overall Executive 
Branch workforce only declined by 18.2% from 2,188,647 tol, 789,514 (OPM: 2000). 
Acquisition Reform Initiatives. DOD acquisition has been the subject of 
numerous commissions calling for reform to simplify the process, cut cost, and maintain 
or improve mission capability. As listed in a Templin and Heberling article, the 
commissions have recommended the following: 
1. emulation of private sector buying practices (1983 Grace Commission); 
2. decreased use of military specifications (Mil specs) and increased use of 
commercial products (1983 Grace Commission and 1986 Packard 
Commission); and 
3. use of commercial style competition rather than price-based competition (1970 
Fitzhugh Commission and 1986 Packard Commission). (Templin and 
Heberling, 1994:42-43) 
Templin and Heberling report a J. Ronald Fox conclusion from a review of 12 major 
studies that attempts to improve the acquisition process have largely been ineffective 
until the last decade (Templin and Heberling, 1994). Today, ideas abound regarding 
what to change in the acquisition process and how to do it. 
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 and the Federal 
Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) of 1996 are enabling the DOD to find ways to reduce 
costs. FARA mandates compliance with 41 U.S.C. 404, which states that government- 
wide procurement policies, regulations, and procedures promote economy, efficiency, 
and effectiveness in the procurement of property and services by the executive branch of 
the federal government. 
The 1970 Fitzhugh Commission and the 1986 Packard Commission call for the 
use of best commercial practices (Templin and Heberling, 1994:43). Best commercial 
practices are those practices that have proven to be successful by the commercial sector 
as evidenced by quantifiable cost reductions or gains in competitive advantage that can 
be replicated. DOD's implementation of commercial purchasing practices in response to 
acquisition reform initiatives was limited until the mid 1990's. A Templin and Heberling 
article, which compares the results of three master's thesis research efforts for the Air 
Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), suggests that using commercial practices and 
removing regulatory obstacles enhances the potential for reducing cost (49). Therefore, if 
DOD implements the use of commercial practices, the government may finally achieve 
real savings in DOD acquisition programs. 
Long-term Purchasing Methods 
Traditional Purchasing. Priced options have been the DOD's traditional 
purchasing strategy used to establish longer-term contractual relationships. The elements 
of a traditional purchasing relationship identified by Stuart are: 
1. primary emphasis on price; 
2. shorter-term contracts; 
3. evaluation by bid or arms length negotiations; 
4. many suppliers; 
5. improvement benefits are shared based on relative power; improvement at 
discrete time intervals; 
6. problems are suppliers responsibility to correct; 
7. information is proprietary; and 
8. a clear delineation of business responsibility (Stuart, 1993:23) 
The priced option strategy is normally implemented through arm's length competitive 
negotiations. The basic contract is usually one year with several option years.   The 
options are unilaterally exercised by the government based on the requirements of the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). The FAR states that the contracting officer may 
exercise options only after determining that - 
1. funds are available; 
2. the requirement covered by the option fulfills an existing government need; 
3. the exercise of the option is the most advantageous method of fulfilling the 
government's need, price and other factors considered; and 
4. the option was synopsized in accordance with FAR Part 5 unless exempted by 
5.202(a)(ll) or other appropriate exemptions in 5.202 (FAR, 2000:17.207(c)). 
The traditional strategy ignores the impact of the type of item or service being purchased 
on the type of relationship needed to execute the program effectively and efficiently. 
Further, the traditional method does not link contractor performance to continuing the 
business relationship. 
New Purchasing Strategy. Due to budgetary reductions, force structure 
reductions, and reform initiatives, it is critical to select the appropriate purchasing 
strategy in acquiring and managing mission capability. One commercial purchasing 
strategy is to reward contractor performance with continuing business. The Air Force 
Material Command (AFMC) recently instituted a similar strategic purchasing method on 
several programs. This strategic purchasing method is an award term incentive that 
provides for extensions or reductions to the term of the contract based on the contractor's 
level of performance. 
Background. The commercial sector has been consolidating and 
downsizing for over a decade. U.S. defense contractors have merged with each other in 
an effort to remain competitive (Gregory, 1997). The reorganized companies realized 
they did not have the economies of scale to achieve efficiencies for some functions. 
Continuing competitive pressure led some companies to contract out services that were 
previously performed in-house (Wilcox, 1995:53). DOD's industrial base has 
experienced these same competitive pressures. Although the DOD is responding to the 
budget constraints and workforce reductions, DOD acquisitions have not generally 
occurred in a perfectly competitive market. 
Contracting for services is not new; however, the emphasis is growing larger than 
just contracting for individual services. Entire departments or functions are sometimes 
eliminated and their activities acquired from a supplier. The type of supplier relationship 
needed for outsourced functions depends on how close the activity is to the organization's 
core competence. "A core competence refers to a skill, process, or resource that 
distinguishes a company and makes it unique compared to other firms" (Monczka et. al., 
1998:213). Outsourcing strategies have become central to an organization's overall 
purchasing strategy. One definition of outsourcing used in the DOD is "the transfer of a 
function previously performed in-house to an outside provider" (DOD, 1996:1). 
Sourcing Management. During the beginning of this century, the Air 
Force will continue to experience diminishing budgets and shrinking manpower. The 
traditional approach of owning a capability or managing a large number of suppliers of a 
capability through arm's length relationships is changing to a strategic source 
management approach. "Sourcing management involves integrating supplier capabilities 
into organizational processes to achieve a competitive advantage through cost reduction, 
technology development, quality improvement, cycle time reduction, and delivery 
capabilities to meet customers' requirements" (Monczka et. al., 1998:4). Therefore, it is 
important to explore the commercial practice of sourcing management to reduce mission 
capability cost and to reduce the cost of contract relationship management. 
Government Barriers to Strategic Purchasing. Government source 
selection practices were found as a barrier in five consolidated studies by Templin and 
Heberling and include the following components: award based on price; insufficient 
proposal time; set-asides; delay in awards; award to poor performer (inability to reward 
good performers); and the solicitation format. Over 90% of the firms found DOD 
contracts difficult to understand.   This is the top barrier. Tied at 81.8%, the second 
highest barriers are price based awards (without past performance) and inability to reward 
good suppliers with repeat business (Templin and Heberling, 1994:49). These are serious 
barriers to sourcing manag ement within the DOD. 
Performance-based Strategy. Leading up to the 21st century, acquisition 
reform efforts included rewrites to major portions of the FAR and many of its 
supplements. The new DOD policy is to maximize performance, innovation, and 
competition. Performance-based strategies for the acquisition of services should be 
implemented wherever possible. 
As services become an increasingly significant component of what the 
Department buys, we must ensure that we acquire them effectively and 
efficiently. That is why the use of performance-based acquisition strategies for 
services remains among my highest priorities (Gansler, 2000:1). 
Prior to the issuance of the new policy, AFMC applied acquisition reform by 
awarding several new contracts using a performance-based acquisition strategy to include 
an award term incentive provision. This provision allows extensions or reductions to the 
length of the contract period based on the performance of the contractor. According to a 
briefing prepared by Major Vincent Feck, AFMC, the award term incentive is a: 
derivative concept of award fee contracts where the contractor, instead of earning 
fee for performance as in award fee contracts, earns additional periods of 
performance without having to compete for the award. Award term provisions 
provide a method of fostering long-term relationships and rewarding good 
performance (Feck, 1999:3). 
Award term incentive contracting is the Air Force's attempt at achieving a long-term 
strategic purchasing relationship. 
Models 
A commercial sector supplier partnership model and a conceptual award term 
incentive model are described and presented. 
Commercial Supplier Partnership Model. The supplier partnership 
arrangement establishes an ongoing relationship between strategic alliances. The 
mutually dependent relationship requires contract vehicles with longer planning horizons 
and performance periods.   A strategic purchasing partner is defined here as, "an 
agreement between a buyer and a supplier that involves a commitment over an extended 
period, and includes the sharing of information along with the sharing of risks and 
rewards of the relationship" (Ellram, 1995:10). Figure 1 is a representation of a 
commercial supplier partnership model. 
Conceptual Award Term Incentive Model. In looking for ways to manage 
programs efficiently and effectively, the government is looking to industry's example of 
outsourcing. The award term incentive is the Air Force's purchasing method to emulate 
the best commercial practice of establishing strategic supplier partnerships. Application 
of award term incentive contracting is evolving to reduce risk and increase benefits to the 
Air Force. Figure 2 presents a conceptual representation of AFMC's strategic purchasing 
award term incentive model. This model depicts impacts from the DOD acquisition 
environment including the type of function being procured, the legal and regulatory 
environment, the competitive environment, and the capability needs of the reduced 
workforce. This research effort is limited to pre-contract award factors of this model. 
Research Problem 
Forthcoming implementation of Air Force FAR supplement (AFFARS) 5317.7X, 
Incentive Term Extension, may increase the number of acquisitions using an award term 
incentive provision as a method of strategic source management (AFFARS, 2000). Prior 
Phase 1 - Preliminary Phase 
• Establish Strategie Need 
• Form Team 
• Confirm Top Management Support 
Phase 2 - Identify Potential Partners 
• Determine Selection Criteria 
• Identify Potential Partners 
Phase 3 - Screen and Select 
•    Contact Potential Partners 
• Evaluate Partners 
• Decision 
V 
Phase 4 - Establish Relationship 
• Document Expectations/Contacts 
• Provide High Attention Level 
• Give Prompt Feedback 
Phase 5 - Evaluate Relationship 
• Continue at Current Level 
• Expand/Build Relationship 





Figure 1: Commercial Supplier Relationship Model (Ellram, 1991: 27) 
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Figure 2: Conceptual Award Term Incentive Model 
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research has resulted in a model depicting the factors that influence supplier partnerships 
for the commercial sector. However, there is no FAR coverage or DOD guidance for 
establishing the award term incentive and the commercial model does not address DOD 
unique factors. 
Purpose and Objective of Research.^ The purpose of this research is to identify 
and examine the nature of the factors for establishing and implementing the award term 
incentive strategy in DOD suppler relationships.   Further, the objective of this research is 
to develop an award term incentive model that will assist DOD acquisition professionals 
in formulating strategic purchasing relationships. 
Research Questions. To guide development of an award term incentive model 
the following research questions were developed. Each is described below: 
1. What is different about the functional capability of what we are buying that 
requires the establishment of strategic contractual relationships using the award 
term incentive? 
This question identifies how the capability being acquired determines the degree of the 
purchasing relationship for the award term model. Near critical items can introduce an 
internal competitive element for the procurement of the capability. 
2. How are long-term strategic supplier relationships established using the award 
term incentive in the public procurement environment? 
The information gained from this question identifies the controlling the legal and 
regulatory factors when implementing the award term incentive concept. 
3. What is the nature of the DOD competitive market when using the award term 
incentive? 
This question identifies and defines the nature of the DOD market when using the award 
term incentive. 
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4.   What capabilities do the downsized acquisition corps needed in order to plan and 
implement the strategic supplier relationship using the award term incentive? 
This information identifies areas of training and levels of knowledge or skill need by 
acquisition personnel to implement the award term incentive method in DOD 
acquisitions. 
Methodology 
This research is a qualitative case study and comparative analysis. The conceptual 
award term incentive model was developed from the commercial literature on strategic 
purchasing relationships and expanded to describe the use of award term incentive tool. 
The case study was used to identify the factors and describe the complex environment 
that influences establishing and maintaining strategic purchasing relationships in the 
DOD acquisition environment. A comparative analysis was conducted to examine the 
strength of the explanation provided by the new model. 
The case study consists of an examination of contractual documents and 
interviews with members of five AFMC integrated product teams (IPTs) currently using 
the award term incentive tool. A review of Air Force records identified seven contracts 
that had implemented this strategic purchasing method. One case used a different tool 
than the award term incentive. This case was excluded from this research effort. In a 
second case, the acquisition strategy had been revised to eliminate the award term 
incentive and was excluded for this research effort. The data was analyzed to find themes 
and patterns to describe the new model. The theoretical content of the model was 
established through literature review. A comparative analysis was conducted to 
determine the validity of the final award term incentive model. 
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Scope and Limitations^ Within the Air Force, only AFMC is currently 
developing internal supplemental regulations for award and administration of award term 
incentive contracts. Further, Maj Vincent Feck of AFMC/PK initiated a case to 
incorporate the award term incentive into the AFFARS 5317, Special Contracting 
Methods. Mr. Tim Beyland, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary (Contracting) confirmed 
that AFMC is the first to implement this strategic purchasing tool. The current 
application of award term incentive is fee for services requirements or single award 
indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity depot maintenance contracts. AFMC is the 
primary procuring branch of fee for service and depot maintenance for the Air Force. Due 
to these factors, research was restricted to AFMC contracts. 
Summary 
Although prior research has developed models for strategic sourcing management 
for the commercial sector, no such model exists for the Air Force's award term incentive 
process of strategic sourcing management. The results from this research develop a 
model for strategic sourcing management by establishing performance-based long-term 
relationships with suppliers. The model will be used by the Air Force for cost reduction, 
technology development, cycle time reduction, and quality improvement. The award term 
incentive model was based on the commercial literature on strategic purchasing 
relationships and expanded to describe the Air Force tool. This research will add to the 
body of knowledge to be considered during acquisition strategy development and 
contract negotiations of the award term incentive. The following chapters include a 
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review of the literature, a description of the research methodology, a presentation of the 
research analysis and results, and a recommendation for future research. 
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II. Literature Review 
Introduction 
Chapter II is a literature review, which initially describes the need for acquisition 
reform and the implementation of best commercial practices. This is followed by a 
review of the types of supplier relationships and of the types of capabilities acquired. 
The strategic purchasing literature review includes purchasing partnerships and strategic 
relationships. The chapter provides a discussion of legal and regulatory environment and 
of the DOD economic market in which award term incentive strategies operate. 
Concluding this chapter is a review of the purchasing skill development literature. 
Reform Initiatives Needed 
During the early 1990's, many asked why DOD spending was continuing to 
increase. The answer is complex, including prior program obligation and commitments 
as well as the new requirement to combat simultaneous threats for two major regional 
conflicts. The DOD budget was reduced and acquisition leaders told to find savings to 
meet the threat requirements. Numerous commissions and studies have found the federal 
acquisition process to be slow, cumbersome, and costly. A primary way to achieve some 
of the hoped for peace dividend was to reform the acquisition process to emulate the 
private sector by incorporating best commercial practices. 
The military is continuing to experience diminishing budgets and shrinking 
manpower. Therefore, the traditional approach of owning a capability or managing a 
large number of suppliers of a capability through arms length relationships is changing to 
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a more efficient sourcing management approach. Sourcing management, as defined by 
Monczka in Chapter I, requires integrating supplier capabilities into organizational 
processes to achieve a competitive advantage through cost reduction, technology 
development, quality improvement, and cycle time reductions to meet customers' 
requirements. It is important for the DOD to continue implementing commercial 
sourcing management practices to reduce mission capability costs and to reduce the cost 
of contract relationship management. 
Commercial Practices 
Public institutions regard the processes and methods employed in the private 
sector as commercial practices. However, commercial practices in one industry may not 
be applicable to another industry. Some studies have identified practices crossing 
industry boundaries, which provide companies with efficiencies not previously used in 
the public acquisition process (Templin and Heberling, 1994).   Practices that have won 
awards or that are better than the current practice are considered best practices, but there 
is not a consensus on these descriptions. As identified in the DOD IPT Training Course, 
2000, some criteria for assessing whether commercial practices are best are listed below: 
• They have proven successful over relatively long time periods. 
• They usually produce quantifiable results. 
• They are usually innovative. 
• They can be repeated, although this is often a most challenging task. 
• They are not tied to specific locations or industries (DOD, 2000). 
The DOD training course indicates that finding methods to implement best commercial 
practices to help IPTs achieve specific program goals is more important than identifying 
and mandating use of a commercial practice. 
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In the late 1980's, the acquisition corps was stagnated in rigid Government rules 
and standard operating procedures. The acquisition leaders have become fond of many 
best commercial practices and have mandated that some be applied on all programs. 
Some practices discussed are EPTs, performance specifications, commercial 
specifications, minimization of cost reporting, and the subject of this research, award 
term incentive contracting. 
IPTs. The DOD leadership endorses best commercial practices that revolve 
around the integrated product and process development practice using EPTs. These multi- 
discipline teams are most effective when there is need for cross-functional 
communication. Implementation of joint contractor and DOD evolutionary development 
processes and risk management programs are essential to achieving results. 
The tools used for implementing risk identification, such as production readiness 
reviews, understate the risks present in DOD programs. Ironically, commercial firms with 
more technology information still identified some risks as high that need to be resolved in 
production; where as DOD program managers, who accept more unknowns and technical 
advances, do not assess risks as high. Commercial program managers are motivated and 
rewarded to report technology failures early to prevent future profit losses. Many times 
DOD program managers find themselves in the role of program advocate and are more 
likely to report highly optimistic program outcomes (Christensen et.al., 1999). Although, 
DOD is using many of practices from the private sector, the implementation is not 
achieving the same results due to the different environment in which the DOD operates. 
Performance Specification. Previously, DOD used design or product 
specifications that limited contractors' innovation in meeting the Government's needs. 
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Performance specifications provide flexibility to the contractor and enhance DOD's use 
of best value source selection processes. Risk of performance is shifted to the supplier 
and the Government pays a premium for this risk transfer. However, the possibility of 
innovative technological solutions may offset this premium in cost savings and value. 
Commercial Specifications. Acquiring a capability using commercial 
specifications allows DOD to capture the savings and quality associated with a normal 
economic environment. By abandoning military specified items for commercial off-the- 
shelf products, the DOD is seeking market quality for a market price. Theoretically, the 
quality should be better and the price should be lower than the usual DOD monopolistic 
and monopsonistic environment. However, misuse of this commercial practice can lead 
to problems. For example, a commercial style contract was awarded sole source using 
firm-fixed prices for the C-130J aircraft. The "J" model incorporated the development of 
new technologies using commercial specifications and standards. The cost per aircraft 
has dramatically increased because of the military unique requirements. 
Minimization of Cost Reporting. Submission of cost data is rarely imposed by 
the commercial world. Cost information may be shared within an established 
commercial supply chain. However, Government acquisition officials have come to rely 
on certified cost and pricing data since the passage of the Truth in Negotiations Act in 
1962. In many cases, contractors have been forced to maintain two cost accounting 
systems. The cost of this expensive proposition is passed on to the Government in the 
form of higher overhead rates. The DOD has achieved cost savings from waiving this 
requirement. One example is the lowered flyaway cost of the C-17 production aircraft. 
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Award Term Incentive. Establishing longer-term strategic relationships for 
critical and some important commodity items incentivize industry investment and 
performance, while reducing government acquisition lead times and the overall cost of 
relationship management. Award term is an effective tool to emulate the long term 
strategic purchasing relationship found in the commercial sector where good performance 
is rewarded with continued business. An appropriate use of this commercial practice 
would be for a service that the government knows it will buy far into the future. The 
award term stabilizes demand, which incentivizes capital investment in the capabilities 
required. This type of incentive was lacking in previous DOD acquisition strategies. 
Other Commercial Practices. Commercial practices can lead to the deployment 
of new capabilities faster, better, and cheaper if each unique program assesses which 
practices are best for their program. Simpler commercial style contract documents will 
encourage commercially innovative firms to do business with the DOD (Templin and 
Heberling, 1994). The commercial practice of performance based payments is not only a 
way to incentivize performance, but allows for the efficient management of program 
technical, schedule, and cost performance parameters. 
DOD has heeded the call for implementation of best commercial practices. 
Templin and Heberling advanced the understanding of the need for commercial buying 
practices in the DOD by distilling information from three industry studies and two 
general studies. Their article, and the five previous studies introduced in Chapter I, 
identified and ranked important barriers to DOD acquisitions and the benefits that 
commercial practices can provide the Government. Reform initiatives resulted from 
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studies and from articles such as this one. These efforts laid the foundation for change 
for the DOD acquisition environment. 
Types of Supplier Relationships 
The literature supports the idea that the level of an organization's strategic plan 
for purchasing proceeds along a continuum (Fontenot & Wilson, 1997 and Paun, 1997). 
Before implementing strategic purchasing procedures, the organization needs to 
understand the various supplier relationships. Cavinato proposes a breakout of buyer- 
seller relationships (Cavinato, 1992): 
1. Don't know supplier exists. Don't care. 
2. Don't know supplier exits. Might use them if I did know, though. 
3. Arm's length, price-oriented relationship: high value, low risk of obtaining in 
the marketplace, traditional (i.e. taxicab ride). 
4. Price relationship; cooperative from time to time (i.e. returning pallets to the 
supplier to reduce the price of the next shipment). 
5. Price relationship; collaborative over time (i.e. sharing demand forecasts with 
suppliers so they can level their manufacturing; helps reduce costs). 
6. Total cost relationship; cooperating on total supply chain to reduce total costs 
(i.e. providing performance rather than product specifications to supplier so 
they can reduce manufacturing costs). 
7. Value relationship; linking suppliers to customers to emphasize 
product/service value. 
8. Joint ventures; complementary relationships uniting strong/weak attributes of 
companies. 
9. Vertical integration strategies: 
a. purchasing capital assets for suppliers; 
b. buying supplier and treating as a subsidiary; and 
c. complete vertical integration of the capability 
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The first three relationships identified are based on price. The supplier reducing 
their costs so the purchasing organization can obtain the benefits of those reduced costs 
characterizes relationship type 4, 5, and 6. In numbers 7 and 8, the relationships become 
tools of strategy to achieve a competitive advantage. Here the supplier is coming 
together in an alliance with the procuring organization and with the customer. It becomes 
a teaming arrangement with the buyer acting as the coordinator and facilitator to meet the 
customers' need. Although the Government does not vertically integrate by owning part 
of a private firm, we do provide Government Furnished Property. 
Nature of Capability 
All acquisition strategies are based upon the type of capability being procured. 
Therefore, the type of purchasing relationship depends on the category of the capability. 
Kraljic offers a specific way to classify items as discussed below (Kraljic, 1983). 
Petrillo provides an integration of the types of relationships and the types of capabilities 
(Petrillo, 1998: 54-56). 
Critical Capability (high value, high risk). This is the product (or product 
component) or service for which the firm is in business; the items that are central to the 
firm's distinctive technical capability or core competence. Core competencies are "key" 
or "fundamental" capabilities that will provide the firm's competitive edge and basis of 
value creation for the future (Freeman, 1990:44). For the DOD, a critical capability 
would be the mission of defending the Constitution, the United States, and its interests. 
Often there exist only limited sources of criticals, subject to the complexities and 
uncertainties of the environment. When procuring critical competencies, the most 
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sophisticated partnering relationships are employed. This type of relationship focuses on 
customer value as in the relationships of number 7 (value relationships) and number 8 
(joint ventures), above. 
Commodities (high value, low risk). These products (or product components) or 
services are part of the high value items that the firm needs to stay in business. To this 
degree, they are like the criticals, except they are readily available in the marketplace. 
We expect to see cost reduction relationships associated with these items, as those 
described in numbers 4, 5, and 6, above. 
Generics (low value, low risk). These are the items the firm needs to operate the 
business. They are readily available in the marketplace and have little or no distinctive 
qualities. There is little or no risk associated with these items, and not much value to be 
gained by distinguishing one from another. We expect firms to try to minimize the time 
spent acquiring these products. Firms will try to maintain arm's length, lowest price 
relationships for these items, like those described in number 3, above. 
Distinctives (low value, high risk). These are items that have been over 
specified. They offer no real value to the firm, but create risk due to their high cost and 
their unavailability in the marketplace. They are bottlenecks in the supply chain. We 
expect firms to be working to identify and eliminate these types of items. 
By plotting requirements against concepts of value and risk, an organization can 
effectively make strategic purchasing decisions. Candidates for award term incentive 
should fall in the high value category for commodity or critical capabilities. Because of 
this, the strategies, management approaches, and tactics for commodity or critical 
purchases are in agreement with the award term acquisition strategy as expressed in 
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Figure 3. These "relationships tend to be oriented around relatively important purchase 
items" (Ellram and Edis, 1996:21). 
Strategic Purchasing 
Strategic purchasing is characterized by the management philosophy of longer- 
term contracts. Although there are fewer suppliers, the evaluation and selection process 
is intensive and extensive. Because the nature of the relationship horizon is longer, 
information systems are established. "The ultimate goal of such an information system is 
to make available to all participants in the supply chain all the information needed at the 
time" (Meredith and Shaffer, 1999:300-301). Problems are solved jointly and 
improvements are sought continuously. A fundamental premise of strategic purchasing is 
the equitable sharing of benefits (Stuart, 1993:23). 
Purchasing Partnerships. Lisa Ellram offers a managerial guideline for the 
development and implementation of purchasing partnerships (Ellram, 1991). The article 
correctly forecasted that partnering would continue to expand and dominate the 
purchasing landscape throughout the 1990s. More importantly, Ellram asserted that 
partnerships would be a source of competitive advantage in most industries. 
Difficulties in managing purchasing partnerships led to lessons learned that 
confirmed the basic principles of partnering that Ellram suggested. These basic 
principles are a) trust, b) communication, c) mutual benefit, d) long-term perspective, 





• Strategies: Key suppliers; 
design to customer or supplier 
specifications; provide 
product/market differentiation 
• Critical factors: 
Manufacturing costs high 
when cost and/or quality 
problems occur; difficult to 
source 
• Time horizon: Variable 
• Management approach: 
Simultaneous engineering and 
some "Supplier Partnerships" 
• Methods: Reduce number of 
products and suppliers 
• Agreement: Sole Source 
Contract 
• Tactics: Decrease uniqueness 
of products unless 
competitive advantage is 
gained 
Criticals 
• Strategies: Strategic Supplier 
Partnerships; design to 
customer or supplier 
specifications; provide 
product/market differentiation 
• Critical factors: Manufacturing 
costs high when cost and/or 
quality problems occur; very 
difficult to source 
• Time horizon: Ten or more years 
• Management approach: Supplier 
Partnerships 
• Methods: Reduce number of 
suppliers 
• Agreement: Contract or Long- 
Term Agreement 





• Critical factors: Cost of 
acquisition 
• Time horizon: Up to one year 
• Management approach: 
Systems contracts; blanket 
orders 
• Methods: Reduce number of 
buys 
. Agreement: Purchase Order 
or credit card 
• Tactics: Increase use of 
technology 
Commodities 
• Strategies: Leverage spend; 
preferred suppliers 
• Critical factors: Cost of materials 
• Time horizon: Five or more years 
• Management approach: Volume 
contracting, and some Supplier 
Partnerships 
• Methods: Reduce number of 
suppliers 
• Agreement: Purchase Order or 
Long-Term Agreement 
• Tactics: Increase business 
volume with fewer suppliers 
Low -Value (cost, service, innovation)- High 
Figure 3: Adaptation of Typology of Capabilities Acquired (Kraljic, 1983) 
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specifically identifies these five principles as the foundation of successful partnerships, 
subsequent literature suggests that the issue of trust in the buyer-seller relationship is the 
cornerstone. 
Trust in Partnerships. The meaning and origin of trust in buyer-seller 
relationships was investigated by Smeltzer (1997). He identified that there are two views 
of trust. Confidence in another's goodwill is the sociological view of trust based on faith 
in another's moral integrity. However, the business view of trust is the predictability of 
one's expectations based on confidence or risk. From the business view, parties attempt 
to mitigate uncertainty of adverse decisions and to control ethical hazards through formal 
contractual means such as guarantees, insurance mechanisms, and laws (Ring & Van de 
Ven 1994). Hosmer integrates these divergent views into one definition. 
Trust is the expectation by one person, group, or firm of ethically justifiable 
behavior—that is, morally correct decisions and actions based upon ethical 
principles of analysis—on the part of the other person, group or firm in a joint 
endeavor or economic exchange (Hosmer, 1995:383). 
For this definition to be useful, purchasing professionals must agree on the definition of 
ethically justifiable behavior. 
Legal Environment 
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 implemented the Government's 
preference for the acquisition of commercial items and broadened the definition of 
commercial items. This Public Law (103-355) established the acquisition policies to 
resemble the commercial market place for commercial items and components. In 1995, 
Part 12—Acquisition of Commercial Items—was added to the FAR and the DOD's 
supplements. Since then, reform of government specifications and standards has taken 
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place. In late 1998, the FAR Part 15—Source Selection Procedures—was completely 
rewritten. The entire DOD acquisition process is still under going changes to identify, 
capture, and implement best commercial practices to manage our supply chain. 
Public law continues to support the requirement for socioeconomic programs, the 
mandate for competition, and DOD's flexibility to terminate for convenience, which are 
industry barriers to DOD acquisitions (Templin and Heberling, 1994). DOD's funding 
instability will impact the ability to manage the supply chain. This is especially true for 
award term contracts that do not have an exemption from competition. 
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act broadened the definition of commercial 
items. This and other reform initiatives are allowing wide latitude in trying best 
commercial practices and are encouraging the use of performance-based specifications 
and commercial standards. However, DOD's priced based competition initiative is 
contrary to managing the supply chain as exhibited by the cutting edge of commercial 
practices to gain insight through cost based analysis 
The award term concept is not covered by regulation and has not been subject to 
litigation at this time. When implementing an award term incentive strategy, it is 
important for the team to consider the impact of laws and regulations. Some laws and 
regulations to consider are economic price adjustments (EPA), the Competition in 
Contracting Act (CICA), the Contract Disputes Act (CDA), and the award term clause. 
The contractual authority to extend the contract will be a unique award term clause. 
Economic Price Adjustment. The FAR does not discuss the renegotiations of 
award term prices. However, in the case of fixed-priced options, the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) has held that renegotiations of option prices when competition is available 
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would constitute a sole source acquisition (Magnavox, 1988). Therefore, it would be 
prudent not to renegotiate award term prices. To mitigate the inherent risk in longer term 
pricing commitments, the contract should include an EPA clause for fixed-priced award 
term incentives as described in FAR (FAR, 2000:16.203). The team must be aware of the 
limitation of an EPA clause; for example, it does not cover changes in indirect rates. 
Competition in Contracting Act. The draft guidance does not address possible 
requirements for a Justification and Approval (J&A) for sole source award of term 
extensions. This may occur if the supplier evaluation and selection did not include prices 
of all the possible term extensions contemplated by the contract. If all the periods under 
the award term extensions were not priced, a J&A would be required by CICA. It is 
unlikely that the GAO would consider an unpriced or not-to-exceed priced award term to 
be within the scope of the competition. Based upon this assumption, solicitations should 
require offerors to propose prices for the maximum award term extension and the 
Government should evaluate them during source selection. 
Contract Disputes Act. The CDA of 1978, as amended (41 U.S.C.601-613), 
establishes procedures and requirements for asserting and resolving claims subject to the 
Act. Recently, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held that an agency could not write a 
contract condition to circumvent the provisions of the CDA (Burnside-ott, 1997). An 
example of the result of this decision is the amendment to the FAR for award fee clauses. 
Prior to the decision, FAR 16.405(e)(3) required award fee clauses to "expressly exclude 
from the operation of the Disputes clause any disagreement by the contractor concerning 
the amount of the award fee" (FAR, 1997). This FAR part was renumbered and was 
rewritten at FAR 16.406 (e)(3). FAR now requires the award fee clause to "expressly 
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provide that the award amount and the award-fee determination methodology are 
unilateral decisions made solely at the discretion of the Government" (FAR, 2000). 
Based on the court decision and on the similarities of the award fee and award term 
concepts, the award term decision is subject to the Disputes process. 
Award Term Clause. The contract should also specify the initial contract term 
or ordering period, as well as the minimum and maximum contract term or ordering 
period. The FAR mandates the use of both positive and negative incentives "to the 
maximum extent practicable" (FAR 2000:37.602-4). Therefore, the award term clause 
should provide for extensions or reductions within the minimum and maximum term. An 
award term clause must be incorporated into Section H of the RFP and into any resulting 
contract. A sample award term clause is provided in Table 1. 
Nature of the Market 
Stimulating the push for increased use of commercial practices is the belief that 
the free market will allow for the establishment of strategic purchasing relationships 
regardless of whether the DOD or a private entity is the buyer. A review of four groups 
of theories will examine whether this assumption is true. The four theories—classic 
microeconomics, contestable markets, transactional cost economics, and game theory— 
all contribute to an understanding of how strategic relationships that the DOD enters into 
are established. 
Classic Microeconomics Theory.   Federal purchasing statutes have attempted to 
force-fit the DOD acquisition environment into the classic free-market theory in which 
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Table 1: Sample Award Term Clause (AFMC, 2000: 111) 
(a) The initial year [contract term or ordering period] may be extended or reduced, 
on the basis of contractor performance, resulting in a(n) [contract term or ordering 
period] lasting a minimum of years from the date of contract award to a maximum 
of years from the date of contract award. 
(b) Monitoring of Performance. The contractor's performance against the measures of 
merit will be continually monitored by the performance monitors whose findings are 
reported to the Award Term Review Board (ATRB). The ATRB recommends award 
term points to the Term Determining Official (TDO) who makes the final decision of the 
award term points based on the contractor's performance during the award term 
evaluation period. 
(c) Award Term Plan. The evaluation criteria and associated grades are specified in the 
award term plan. The evaluation periods with the associated award term 
extensions/reductions and performance criteria with associated award term times are also 
specified in the award term plan. 
(d) Modification of Award Term Plan. Unilateral changes may be made to the Award 
Term Plan if the contractor is provided written notification by the PCO before the start of 
the upcoming evaluation period. Changes affecting the current evaluation must be by 
bilateral agreement. 
(e) Self-evaluation. The contractor will submit to the Contracting Officer (CO) within 
 working days after the end of each award term evaluation period, a brief written self- 
evaluation of its performance for that period. This self-evaluation shall not exceed  
pages. This self evaluation [will or may] be considered in the ATRB's evaluation of the 
contractor's performance during this period. 
(f) Award Term Extension. The contract ordering period may be unilaterally modified to 
reflect the TDO decision. The total contract ordering period including extensions under 
this clause will not exceed years. If at any time the ordering period or contract term 
has  years or less remaining, the operation of the award term feature will cease and 
the ordering period will not extend beyond the term set at that time. 
(g) Award term determinations and the methodology for determining award term are 
unilateral decisions made solely at the discretion of the Government. 
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market forces set the terms and conditions of the relationship (Gansler, 1989; Heberling 
and Graham, 1993; and Peterson, 1987). The Competition in Contracting Act requires the 
DOD and other agencies to acquire its goods and services via full and open competition. 
This lofty requirement fails to recognize that DOD acquisitions generally occur in a 
market characterized by oligopoly, monopoly, or monopsony conditions. The market 
becomes less effective as it moves away from perfect competition. For example, as the 
number of sellers decreases, the amount of control over the terms and conditions of the 
agreement exerted by an individual seller increases (ASPM, 1986: 2-3). 
Contestable Markets. Contestable market theorists believe that a market 
comprised of a monopoly or oligopoly can still provide the benefits of perfect 
competition. A perfectly contestable market is one in "which entry is completely free, 
from which exit is costless, in which entrants and incumbents compete on complete 
symmetric terms, and entry is not impeded" (Baumöl, 1982:349). Entry and exit barriers 
can result from government laws and regulations. 
Experts agree that the military industrial base does not operate in a free market. 
Many important assumptions of free market economic theory are absent from the defense 
market (Gansler, 1989:158-160). One missing characteristic is free entry and exit from 
the market, conditions necessary for contestable markets. Another contestable market 
characteristic missing is a pool of potential entrants able to respond quickly to a market 
opportunity (Bailey and Baumöl, 1984:120-121). 
Transactional Cost Economics. Transactional Cost Economics (TCE) is an 
interdisciplinary theory combining organizational and economic theory with components 
of contract law. The cost of the transaction is the friction that occurs between the parties 
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to an exchange (Williamson, 1981).   Templin finds there are transaction costs associated 
with proposal preparation and with source selection activities that increase significantly 
as the number of unique requirements increase (Templin, 1994). 
Transaction costs increase for the suppliers to DOD contracts because of the vast 
number of unique acquisition laws and regulation. One comparison found it is five times 
more expensive to propose on defense solicitations than commercial invitations. Further, 
this study found it costs three times more to administer a defense contract than a 
commercial effort (Center for Strategies and International Studies, 1993). 
Game or Bargaining Theory. Game theory holds that competitors will propose 
unrealistic, below-cost prices in an attempt to win a contract. FAR states that a buy-in 
occurs when a contractor submits an offer below anticipated costs with the intent to (1) 
increase the contract amount after award through unnecessary or over-priced change 
orders or (2) receive follow-on contracts at artificially high prices to recoup the losses 
experienced in the initial contract (FAR, 2000:3.501-1). Gansler finds that the 
Contracting Officer can play the oligopoly game, in which they play the contractors 
against one another in an attempt to win promises of high performance, low cost, and 
early delivery (Gansler, 1989). Such a strategy further encourages the contractor to buy - 
in, with the intent of later recouping losses. 
Heberling and Graham recommend that the DOD must anticipate and counter 
contractor pricing strategies to prevent or mitigate buy -ins. The Government should limit 
the use of noncompetitive, follow-on contracts by pricing the primary contract and all of 
the follow-on vehicles at the award of the initial contract (Heberling and Graham, 1993). 
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The competitive pricing of all potential award term incentive extensions is one 
mechanism for preventing buy-ins. 
Acquisition Corps' Capabilities 
The philosophy and roles of acquisition professionals have evolved in the DOD 
over the last decade. A recent RAND study illustrates how the philosophy and roles are 
changing from transaction oriented to a strategic relationship role (RAND, 1999). Figure 
4 identifies and depicts the affect of changing management roles. As the relationship 
moves from transaction to strategic based, the relationship becomes more labor intensive 
and the number of people needed to manage the relationship increases. 
Size and Stability of Work Force. The study identifies that arms-length 
transactions are established and executed with few people. However, as the strategic 
importance of the relationship increases, the manpower required to establish and execute 
the relationship increases. In a study of 100 pairs of buyer-supplier partners, successful 
"partnerships tend to be developed by a team, with the full support and cooperation of top 
management" (Ellram and Edis, 1996: 21). The intensity of strategic purchasing 
"relationships limits the number that can be managed effectively, usually about 1 percent 
or less of the purchasers supplier base" (21). This indicates DOD needs to establish 
stable teams to implement successful strategic purchasing relationships. Management 
should consider the labor intensity of the strategic relationship and the current size of the 
work force when implementing strategic relationships. 
Strategic Purchasing Skills. Over the past few years, the role of contracting has 
begun to play a more significant role in the establishment of strategic purchasing 
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Figure 4: Adaptation of Changing Roles (Rand and Casbon, 1999) 
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relationships. Freeman and Cavinato indicate that the human skills of the purchasing 
function must be congruent with the strategies of the organization (Freeman and 
Cavinato, 1990:7).   Therefore management must identify and "tailor its personnel skills 
to the needs of the total organization" (10). Historically, the purchasing function was 
viewed as clerical and not strategic by some organizations. In a longitudinal empirical 
study on strategy development by David Farmer, it was "found that the top managers did 
not realize the importance of developing the expertise in the purchasing function" 
(Farmer, 1978:7). The acquisition corps for the DOD will need the skills to think 
strategically in planning and in establishing strategic purchasing relationships. 
Summary 
This chapter reviewed the literature that describes the need for acquisition reform 
and the implementation of best commercial practices. The description of best 
commercial practices provided a discussion of IPTs, performance specifications, 
commercial specifications, minimization of cost reporting, award term incentive, and 
other commercial practices. This was followed by a review of the types of supplier 
relationships and the nature of the capabilities acquired. The strategic purchasing 
literature review included purchasing partnerships, strategic relationships, and the 
acquisition corps' capability needs for implementing award term incentive. The chapter 
provided a discussion of the legal and regulatory environment and of the DOD economic 
market in which the award term incentive strategy will have to operate. The four 
economic theories discussed were classic microeconomics, contestable markets, 
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transactional cost economics, and game theory. Chapter III discusses the methodology 
that will be used to collect and analyze the data available. 
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III. Research Methodology 
This chapter discusses and explains the research design selected for this case 
study. A qualitative method was chosen using multiple case studies as well as a 
comparative analysis. The three-part research design of sources of data selection and 
validation, protections of quality, and data analysis was used to implement the 
methodology. An explanation of the relationship between the research questions and the 
interview questions is provided in this chapter. Finally, a discussion of the data analysis 
process is provided and the research methodology is summarized. 
Case Study Design 
Although the terms qualitative and case study are frequently interchanged, they 
are not synonymous. Case studies can rely on the use of qualitative data, quantitative 
data, or a combination (Yin, 1994:14). This method may include a single or multiple case 
design. Multiple case studies are undertaken to replicate and/or test a previous study 
(45).   This means that the data observed are similar across several cases and are used to 
draw conclusions. This approach is taken to ensure that the observed phenomenon is not 
a rare case. The use of multiple case studies is different from sampling logic in 
quantitative studies, where the results of a number of samples are assumed to be 
predictive of the entire population (47). 
The qualitative method is distinguished by the researcher's interaction with the 
subjects while gathering data. Categories derived from the study are not precisely 
identified before hand, but the categories emerge with study progression (Creswell, 
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1994:7). Information may be verified by observing the pattern in different categories. 
This study is characterized by the interactive nature between the researcher and the 
subjects in question. The interviews completed by the researcher took place over the 
telephone or in person. Follow-up questions were asked immediately to clarify points in 
the research. As possible patterns in the data developed, the interview response category 
was modified to aid the search for patterns in the data. 
The qualitative method is often used to investigate a new topic whose 
characteristics are still unknown. This is known as exploratory research and is used 
because no model has been developed about the topic (Creswell, 1994:9). "The social 
sciences are filled with concepts that are difficult to operationalize for scientific analysis" 
(Petrillo, 1998:87). For example, it is easier to discuss supplier relationships than it is to 
observe its application or measure its value. Latent variables, such as trust, sometimes 
affect the factor but are unobservable and difficult to test quantitatively (87). 
Inductive and Deductive Reasoning. Theory or theoretical model based 
research cycles consist of a few repeating steps: induction, deduction, and tests. After 
testing, the results contribute to another induction, and the sequence begins again. The 
induction phase develops general relationships that may explain specific observations. 
Deduction derives specific assertions from general principles. Therefore, induction 
moves from the level of observation or indicator to the level of theory or constructs. 
Conversely, deduction moves for the level of theory to the level of observation (Dooley, 
1995: 65-66). 
Although commercial strategic purchasing relationships are discussed in the 
literature, there is no previous research data available regarding award term incentive 
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contracting for use as a basis for this study. Case study methodology has a distinctive 
advantage when asking "how, what or why" questions about a contemporary phenomena 
"over which the investigator has little or no control" (Yin, 1994: 5- 9). This research 
concerns itself with the inductive phase of the research cycle proposed by Dooley and 
discussed above. The literature review, document review, and the interview observations 
and information collected proposes order to the data through inductive reasoning. As a 
result of the researcher/subject interaction required, of the exploratory nature of the study, 
and of the inductive reasoning, the qualitative method was chosen as the appropriate 
method. This research provides reasonable answers to the research questions and 
establishes a model that can be tested in future research. 
Sources of Data 
The selection of award term incentive contracts was by purposive sampling. In 
purposive sampling, the researcher chooses which cases to include as opposed to random 
sampling. 
Interviews. The cases in this research include interviews with the acquisition 
professionals of the entire population of Air Force award term incentive contracts that 
were awarded prior to June 2000 and are currently employing the award term strategy. 
All of the Air Force's award term incentive contracts were awarded by AFMC. Every 
command in the Air Force has different supplements to the FAR. If acquisition 
professionals were selected from another command, the internal validity of the 
comparative analysis would be weakened. Further, AFMC is the lead command for 
procuring logistics capabilities and fee for services.   Due to these factors, research will 
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be restricted to AFMC contracts.   The cases selected were identified using the automated 
management information system (AMIS). 
Contract Documents. This case study focused on the strategic purchasing 
relationship; therefore, analysis of the interactive relationship included the single 
acquisition management plan (SAMP), the award term clause, the award term plan, and 
other documents in the government contract files. 
Literature. Literature and archival sources of data such as books, journal 
articles, professional magazines, regulations, contract documents, and contract files 
relating to the commercial strategic purchasing method and to the award term incentive 
were analyzed.    This effort was undertaken to discover the characteristics and 
relationships of Air Force strategic purchasing. This enabled the researcher to look "for 
constructs that bring order to the descriptive data and that relate these data to other 
research findings reported in the literature" (Gall et al., 1996:549). 
Protections of Quality 
A case study methodology, like all research designs, needs to ensure standards of 
quality are met for construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability 
(Yin, 1994). Actions to assure quality in each area are discussed below. 
Construct Validity. Two tactics that Yin (1994) recommends to ensure construct 
validity are used in this research effort. First, data is collected from multiple sources to 
facilitate a triangulation of converging lines of inquiry. Triangulation of data sources and 
of theory-based perspectives on the same data was accomplished where possible. A 
second tactic used is to establish a chain of evidence. Yin recommends case study 
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database development. Further, the research report should cite relevant portions of that 
database: 
The principle is to allow an external observer or reader of the case study, for 
example—to follow the derivation of any evidence from initial research question 
to ultimate case study conclusions (98). 
Construct definition, validity and measurability is sharpened through an iterative analysis 
of the evidence for each construct (Eisenhardt, 1989:533). This was achieved by 
conducting within and between case analysis. The comparative analysis conducted 
further strengthens operational construct definitions (Cooke and Campbell, 1979). 
Internal Validity. Internal validity deals with establishing a causal relationship— 
where certain conditions lead to other conditions (Yin, 1994:33). Internal validity would 
not normally be applied to an exploratory study such as this. However, the resulting 
model does reflect proposed causal relationships between variables or factors that were 
identified. Pattern matching helps establish that inferences about data collected are 
correct. Between case pattern matching strengthens internal validity (109-111). 
Explanation building through iterative comparative analysis between cases builds internal 
validity (111). Comparison of the new model to literature with similar findings links the 
phenomena. This strengthens the internal validity and raises the findings to a higher 
conceptual level (Eisenhardt, 1989: 544). 
External Validity. External validity deals with the generalizability of the 
findings from the cases in this study to other cases. To strengthen external validity of this 
research, multiple cases were studied (Yin, 1994:45). A comparison to the literature 
sharpened the external validity (Eisenhardt, 1989:533). Analyzing data within the 
framework of several established commercial strategic purchasing models contributes to 
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the external validity of the research (Ellram 1995; Landeros, Reck and Plank, 1995; 
Stuart, 1993; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Watts and Hahn, 1993). 
Reliability. Reliability demonstrates that another researcher using the same data 
collection procedures and the same cases could find the same results. "The goal of 
reliability is to minimize errors and biases in the study" (Yin, 1994:36). Yin recommends 
that a case study protocol and database be used to ensure the final quality criterion of 
reliability. Organizing and documenting all the information in a study database markedly 
increases the reliability of the research (95). Case study procedures for this research were 
documented in the protocol and study database that are discussed in the next section. 
Data Analysis 
Participants in the research were informed of the goals of the study. Participants 
were guaranteed confidentiality in order to encourage open, honest discourse during 
interviews. Data collected was known in detail only by the researcher and advisors 
(Schmitt and Klimoski, 1991). 
Protocol. In a qualitative study, the researcher is considered the primary 
instrument of data analysis (Creswell, 1994:45). However, to organize data gathering, a 
protocol or form is needed. The protocol for this research is an open-ended set of 
questions designed to allow a natural flow of conversation. The cases in this research 
were investigated using the same protocol, which aids in identifying patterns in the data. 
The protocol includes the following two forms: the initial telephone contact guide at 
Appendix A and the interview guide at Appendix B. 
41 
To ensure each contact was informed of the same information, the researcher used 
the initial telephone contact guide.   A set of basic questions was addressed during the 
interviews and while reviewing the literature and documentation. The questions act as 
reminders to the researcher of the data to be collected, as recommended by Yin (1994). 
Schmitt and Klimoski characterize interviews as "conversations with a purpose" 
(1991:139). The questions addressed to research participants are open-ended and 
dynamic in order to facilitate rich discourse.   The interview questions were initially 
mapped to the study's research questions as follows: 
Research Question 1: What is different about the functional capability of what we 
are buying that requires the establishment of strategic contractual relationships 
using award term incentive contracts? 
1. What is the capability or function that is being procured using award term 
incentives? 
2. Is the item unique to DOD? 
3. What are the risk and criticality of the capability or function? 
4. Is this function being outsourced? If yes, is this function considered a near 
core competency and why is it being outsourced? 
Research Question 2: How are long-term strategic supplier relationships 
established using the award term incentive in the public procurement 
environment? 
5. What contract type was used and why? 
6. How does the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) at 41 U.S.C. 253 
and FAR subpart 6 affect the solicitation, selection, and management of 
the award term incentive process? CICA requires contracting officers to 
promote and to provide for full and open competition in soliciting offers 
and awarding public contracts. 
7. How does the Service Contract Act at (4) U.S.C. 353 (d) which provides 
that contracts that are subject to the Act may not exceed 5 years affect the 
solicitation, selection, and management of the award term incentive? 
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8. How does the Anti-deficiency Act affect the solicitation, selection, and 
management of the award term incentive process? Specifically, what is the 
affect of government unique appropriations, authorizations, and funding 
limitations? 
9. How does the Truth-in-Negotiations Act affect the solicitation, selection, 
and management of the award term incentive process? 
10. What other laws or regulations that affect the solicitation, selection, and 
management of the award term incentive process? 
11. Were any unique terms and conditions incorporated in the contract? If 
yes, what and why? 
Research Question 3: What is the nature of the DOD competitive market when 
using the award term incentive? 
12. What characterized the market for this acquisition? 
13. Did the supplier operate in a competitive market? 
14. Did the supplier have a competitive edge? 
15. Does the solicitation or the contract contain organizational conflict of 
interest provisions? If yes, why was it necessary? Did it affect the 
competitive market? 
16. Was there a potential for a buy-in? 
17. What steps, if any, were taken to prevent a buy-in? 
Research Question 4: What capabilities do the downsized acquisition corps need 
in order to plan and implement the strategic supplier relationship using the award 
term incentive ? 
18. What role did the participant play in the case? 
19. How long has the participant served in the current position? 
20. How much experience does the participant have in related areas? 
21. Has the participant used an award term incentive before? 
22. How often are team members transferred? 
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23. Has the Term Determination Official changed since award of the contract? 
24. Has the participate received or provided award term incentive training? 
Database Coding. Notes were kept during data collection in the field and on the 
telephone. Data points collected from each document or interview were reduced to 
separate computerized note cards. All note cards from a single source were coded (A-l- 
01 through E-4-24) to maintain linkage with the data source. The alpha code references 
the case. The middle number refers to the research question. The last two-digit number 
refers to an interview question associated with that case. 
Analysis Coding. Initially, three types of analysis coding were used during 
different stages of the investigation (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). These coding types were 
open coding, axial coding, and selective coding. Open coding was used to categorize the 
data, which is similar to developing descriptive statistic. Building on the open coding, 
axial coding developed connections between the cases. To help assess the overlapping 
information between categories the variables from the open coding and the axial coding 
were pattern coded and evaluated across the cases in support of the selective coding. 
Selective coding was used to synthesize the information into the new model. 
The coding process used a method called mind-mapping (Buzan & Buzan, 1993). 
This type of radiant thinking allows thoughts to generate in all directions from a central 
idea, where every idea becomes the nucleus of a new group of ideas. This technique is 
known as concept-mapping in the psychological literature and is explained as 
metacognitive (Novak, 1998).   According to Novak, metacognative learning transpires as 
a person obtains a broad strategy that assists learning or comprehending new information. 
The mind mapping strategy was beneficial in assembling the information within the cases 
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(open coding), in detecting emerging phenomena between the cases (axial coding), and in 
maturing a model to explain the phenomena (selective coding).   The results from the 
mind-mapping process will be discussed further in Chapter 4. 
Variable pattern coding was employed to support the selective coding between 
cases. This allowed the researcher to refine the definition of the constructs identified by 
open and axial coding. Pattern coding identified variables that cross between the focus 
areas, which provided a transition to the selective coding to build the model. A refined 
association of the pattern coded variables to the research question and the operational 
definitions developed by this research area identified in Appendix C. 
Comparative Analysis 
A comparative analysis was conducted between the award term strategic 
purchasing model and the literature. One of the purposes of this research is to identify 
the factors for implementation of strategic purchasing relationships within the DOD. The 
comparative analysis examined the strength of the explanation provided through the 
award term model that was not addressed by the AFMC award term guide. 
Summary 
The primary aim of this exploratory, qualitative case study was to develop a 
model that can help explain the award term incentive strategic purchasing tool. This 
study attempts to identify the characteristics and examine the factors for strategic 
contractor relationships using award term incentive contracts. The research was 
stimulated by the recent acquisition strategy direction provided by the Secretary of the 
Air Force, Principle Assistant Deputy for Acquisition to implement the commercial 
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practice of rewarding performance with a continuing contractual relationship. 
Additionally, this investigation was motivated by AFMC's FAR counsel Case 00-03 for a 
change to AFFARS regulation and by AFMC's new award term guide. 
Several steps were taken to ensure the quality of the research. Five contract 
actions using the award term incentive were researched. The multiple-case study design 
and the use of broad investigative questions facilitated discovery of compelling and 
robust findings. A comparative analysis was conducted to determine whether the data fit 
the model better than the AFMC guide document. 
Results of this exploratory research are reported and analyzed in the next chapter. 
The findings will facilitate future research that will be possible after the award term 
incentive tool has been fully executed. Further, the results will assist decision-makers as 
they continue to develop policy guidance necessary to ensure successful implementation 
of this best commercial practice. The next chapter introduces the results of the within 
case analysis and presents the results of the between case analysis and of the new model 
comparative analysis to the literature. 
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IV. Results and Analysis 
This chapter presents the information gathered and the detailed analysis 
performed on the five acquisitions of this exploratory research. This research identifies 
the unique factors the DOD acquisition workforce will experience when implementing 
the award term incentive method of sourcing management. This chapter is divided into 
four major sections beginning with an overview of the data collected and analyzed. The 
within case analysis is briefly introduced. This is followed by the results of the between 
case analysis section including an emergent model. Concluding this chapter, selective 
coding refines the emergent model into the development of the analytical model. The 
model is supported by a discussion of the case analysis findings and a comparative 
analysis to the literature. 
Overview of the Data 
A review of AFMC files resulted in the identification of five cases currently using 
the award term incentive acquisition concept. Case information was gathered from 
interviews and document reviews. Most of the information was gathered from personal 
interviews with government contracting officers and contract negotiators through field 
visits, telephone communications, and electronic mail communications. However, some 
information was gleaned from program and contract file documentation such as the single 
acquisition management plan, the award term plan, the award term clause, and the 
contract. 
47 
Within Case Analysis 
This section consists of a sample of the analysis resulting from one of the five 
cases studied. The complete results of all five within case study sections, one for each of 
the programs reviewed can be found in their entirety in Appendix D. Each section 
addresses only the information gathered from that particular program. The within case 
analyses are addressed in no particular order of importance. The presentation of each of 
the within cases follows a uniform and set format. Each case is divided into a 
background section and into four focus sections. The background section provides 
general information about each program, the dollar value of the acquisition, the contract 
length, and the experience level of the contracting professionals. The four focus sections 
are Nature of the Capability, Legal and Regulatory Environment, Nature of the DOD 
Competitive Market, Acquisition Corps' Capabilities. These sections were developed 
from the four research questions. 
1. What is different about the functional capability of what we are buying that 
requires the establishment of strategic contractual relationships using award term 
incentive contracts? 
2. How are long-term strategic supplier relationships established using the award 
term incentive in the public procurement environment? 
3. What is the nature of the DOD competitive market when using the award term 
incentive? 
4. What capabilities does the downsized acquisition corps need in order to plan and 
implement the strategic supplier relationship using the award term incentive? 
The information in the four focus sections was open-coded using concept/mind- 
mapping techniques (Novak, 1998:27 and Buzan & Buzan, 1994:139). A pictorial 
representation of the resulting map is presented for each within case analysis. A sample 
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of the Nature of the Capability section for Case D follows. The sample mind map for the 
Case D analysis provides a quick overview of the type of analysis completed for each 
case in the research effort. 
Case D. 
Nature of the Capability. This program procures availability of pilot 
training simulation services. The simulation service is provided on an individual 
simulator and is linked locally to same aircraft type simulators. The service provides the 
capability to be linked long haul through a network provider to other same aircraft type 
simulators and to be linked long haul through a network provider to different aircraft type 
simulators. These services were determined to be of a commercial type and procured 
under FAR Part 12. DOD is currently the only customer of this service. However, there 
is a potential FMS market for this type of simulation service. This is because of the 
unique training required such as flying in formation, air to air tactical mission training, 
and evasive maneuvers. There does not currently exist tactical training except in the 
aircraft. 
Procuring availability of simulation type training as a service reduces the risk 
associated with training in the aircraft. In fact, significant portions of the training will be 
completed solely in the simulator. Simulators provide training with destructive weapons, 
in high-risk maneuvers, and in interoperability at reduced cost of training in the aircraft. 
Previously we own the trainers, now we are contracting for the availability of the service. 
The interviewee indicated that having trained pilots to fly missions is near the Air Force 




























































Figure 5: Sample Case D Open Coded Mind Map 
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The suppliers have the technical expertise or can hire subject matter experts to 
provide the simulation service. By removing the government from the process, the 
supplier can implement concurrency upgrades much faster as we no longer have the 
manpower. Further, there was no development and procurement money available to 
maintain concurrency or to meet the new interoperability training requirement. 
Between Case Analysis 
This section is divided into six major parts; the four focus area parts developed 
from the research questions, summary of the pattern coding, and the emergent model. 
The evolving ideas from across all the cases are synthesized into descriptions of the 
phenomena regarding each research question. Axial coding developed connections 
between the cases. The variable pattern coding identifies overlapping information among 
the focus areas used for the selective coding. The between case analysis results in the 
refining of the conceptual award term incentive model into emergent model. 
The within case analysis open coding was accomplished using mind mapping 
techniques. To compare ideas across cases, axial coding was also accomplished using 
mind maps. In this phase, the four focus areas were placed in the center of the map. 
Then the ideas for that focus area were taken from each of the five open coded mind 
maps for the individual cases. Each idea radiated from that center point. The radiant 
thinking technique allowed the researcher to organize the ideas without being prejudiced 
by the sequence or strength with which they were presented by the different interviewees. 
The number of ideas that evolved from these mind maps are more complex than 
those from the within case analysis. The mind maps were useful for data analysis, but 
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became burdensome for presentation purposes. Therefore, a summary of the data across 
the five cases was necessary. Table 2 cross lists the ideas regarding each of the four 
focus areas and presents them in tabular form. In this table, one can easily see the ideas 
emerging. For example, concerning the nature of the capability procured, the notion that 
type of capability procured affects the need to use the award term incentive for sourcing 
management is evident across all cases. The ideas from the maps were develop into an 
emergent model that describes the phenomena regarding the questions. This emergent 
model is presented at the end of this between case analysis section. 
Nature of the Capability. This first focus area attempts to identify what is 
different about the capability being procured that requires a long-term contractual 
relationship using the award term incentive. All five of the cases identified the 
capability to be very near the AF core mission. All five of the cases involve the 
procurement of services. The five cases determined the benefit or value of the 
relationship exceeded the cost of implementing the strategic relationship for these high 
dollar value services. Four of the cases clearly involve acquisition of leading edge 
technology services that do not exist in the AF today. Case E acquires a service to 
maintain current technology. Except for Case E, the other cases involved reducing risk to 
mission performance. 
Three of the cases procured the service to replace previous government ownership 
of the assets. Case C procured a privately operated network service other than the 
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capability through a private/public competition and no longer owns all the facilities and 
equipment to support the assets. Four of the cases were determined to be of a 
commercial type and Case C was determined to be government unique. Of the five cases, 
only Case E's service was clearly available in the commercial market place. However, 
each case had aspects to varying degrees of a commercial service and to varying degrees 
of a government unique service or of a government unique application. 
Legal and Regulatory Environment. This second focus area attempts to 
identify the controlling laws and regulation in the establishment of strategic purchasing 
relationships using the award term incentive within the public procurement environment. 
In all five cases, actions were taken to avoid ADA violations, to comply with the CICA, 
and to comply with SB A requirements. Various government or program unique terms 
and conditions were incorporated by all five cases. Cases C and E understood the SCA 
five-year performance limitation does not apply to award term incentive clause. Cases A, 
B, and D misapplied the SCA five year performance limitation and plans to mechanically 
limit the number of terms on the contract at any given time. Even if the supplier has 
earned additional terms, terms will not be added until only 4 terms remain on the 
contract. Cases A and D have included the SCA implementing clause and Department of 
Labor (DOL) Wage Determination (WD). A DOL WD was inappropriately applied to 
Case B, however, the contract is being modified to remove this requirement. 
The type of capability being procured was determined to be government unique 
for Case C. Therefore, Case C contracted by negotiation under FAR 15. Cases A, B, and 
D followed FAR 12 acquisition of commercial item procedures. Case E's private 
offerors competed under FAR 12 procedures, but the public offeror was required to 
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comply with portions of FAR 15 procedures. All of the cases, except Case C, 
inappropriately exempted the Term Determining Official's decision from the disputes 
process. 
Nature of the DOD Competitive Market. This third focus area attempts to 
identify how the implementation of the strategic purchasing relationships using the award 
term incentive strategy affects the market we procure from. Ironically, the four cases for 
services deemed to be of a commercial type with government unique aspects had a 
limited number of suppliers. Of these four cases, a commercial market for the service 
existed for Case E. Case C had a large number of suppliers for the service that was 
determined to be government unique with commercial aspects. There is a commercial 
market for Case C's service. Further, the competition for three of the cases' commercial 
services was large business DOD contractors or a team of small business contractors. 
The competition for the Case E commercial service was a large business DOD contractor 
team and a public offeror with a large business DOD partner. The suppliers for the Case 
C government unique service were large and small business suppliers with a commercial 
business base. 
Four of the cases involved high start-up cost and one case involved high proposal 
cost. Cases A, B, and D had government certification barriers and high financial risk. 
Case E had labor knowledge barriers and high financial risk to private suppliers. The 
Case C had low start-up cost and few market entry barriers. One DOD imposed market 
entry barrier for potential suppliers under Case C was the inclusion of an organizational 
conflict of interest (OCI) clause. There was clearly a competitive advantage for the 
awarded suppliers for Cases A and D. The interviewee for Case E asserted there was no 
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competitive advantage between the public team and any private teams. There was clearly 
no competitive advantage for the awarded suppliers for Cases B and C. 
The first four cases are managing risk by shifting it to the supplier. Case E 
attempted to shift the performance, schedule, and cost risk. Certainly, the closing base no 
longer manages this risk, but the government still bears this risk for the portion of the 
service provided by the new public provider. All five cases indicate the pricing or not-to- 
exceed (NTE) pricing of potential award term periods reduces the potential for supplier 
buy-in. Using the award term incentive to shifting technical and cost risk reduced 
supplier buy-in all five cases. 
Acquisition Corps' Capabilities. This last focus area attempts to identify the 
affects force structure reduction has on DOD's ability to plan and to implement long-term 
relationships using the award term incentive. In all five cases, none of the contracting 
professionals had received any award term incentive training. Only the contracting officer 
for Case C had prior experience using the award term tool. The contracting professionals 
in Cases C and E were experienced in buying services. The interviewees in Cases A, B, 
and D had no services buying experience. Their experience was with supply contracts. 
The contracting professionals in Cases C and E were experienced in using ordering type 
contracts. The interviewees in Cases A, B, and D had never used indefinite 
delivery/indefinite quantity (ID/IQ) or ID requirements ordering contracts. Their 
experience was with systems or subsystems definitive contracts. Except in Case E, none 
of the contracting professionals had experience using commercial procurement 
procedures. 
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There was an indication by all the acquisition professionals that a broader base of 
experience is needed in the related procurement processes when using the award term 
incentive. Further, they indicated that additional training is needed as the number of 
services and commercial type procurements increase. In one case, the interviewee 
confessed that the limited training provided for commercial acquisitions was inadequate 
due to the lack of experience of the trainers. In Case C, the contracting professional has 
provided formal award term training to the TDO. In Case E, the contracting professional 
has provided informal training by sharing document with other organizations and has 
conducted evaluation process training for award term evaluators. In four of the cases, the 
contracting professionals were unaware of the FAR changes regarding the CDA under the 
similar award fee concept. In all cases, the professional indicated a lack of time to stay 
current with the dynamic DOD acquisition regulations. 
In Cases A, B, C, and D, members of the IPT were reassigned due to government 
downsizing. In the same four cases, members of the IPT were promoted to other 
positions left vacant by early retirement incentives or normal attrition. Core members, of 
Case E's IPT remained stable throughout the selection process for the largest award term 
incentive contract implemented. However, the IPT for Case E experienced 100% 
turnover within the first year of contract administration. Case E's IPT will be 
experiencing another large change in membership when the base closes. Some members 
of the IPT will choose not to relocate. 
Pattern Coding. The overlapping information among the categories of the 
variables identified with the open and axial coding was pattern coded to assist the 
researcher. Table 3 summarizes the pattern coded data across the cases. The ideas from 
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Table 3: Summary of Pattern Coded Data 
PATTERN 
CODES 
CASE A CASEB CASEC CASED CASEE 
Core/Near X X X X X 
Value X X X X X 
CC X X X 
CT X 
CTO X 
ROAsset X X X 
Sub Asset X 
ROFE X 
Ser X X X X X 
Comm X X X X 
Uniq X 
Comp X X X X X 
SCA X X 
FAR 12 X X X X 
FAR 15 X 
Mult-KT X 
Lim-KT X X X X 
NTEP X 
EP X X X X 
TINA X Some Data 
CICA X X X X X 
CJ&A X 
OCI X 
TforC X X X X 
ADA X X X X X 
A-Fund X X X X 
A-Appro X X X X X 
ID/Req X X X X 
ID/IQ X 
SBA X X X X X 
PPC X 
SB/SDB Plan X X X 
Dis-A X X X X 
UniqTC X X X X 
Cont-Bus X X X X X 
F-B&P X X X X X 
Fin-R X X X X 
Tech-R X X X X X 
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Table 3: Summary of Pattern Coded Data(Continued) 
I-B&P X X X X X 
R-Buyin X X X X X 
Leg Reg X X X X X 
Sm#Sup X X X X 
Lg#Sup X 
LgBus X X X X X 
SmBus X X 
LgBusT X 
SmBusT X 
DODSup X X X 
PubSup X 
ComBusB X X 
NComMkt X X X 
HSC X X X X 
LKB X 
DP X X X X 
BC X 
PR X X X X X 





OE X X X 
SE X X X 
AE X 
the within and between case analysis were used in pattern matching and selective coding 
for the emergent model as well as the final analytical model in the next major section. 
Emergent Model. The within and between case analysis results identified 
overlaps of information among the four focus areas. For example, if the nature of the 
capability is a commercial type then this variable overlaps the purchasing skills needed to 
procure commercial item. The model shown in figure 6 began to emerge. It reveals a 
relationship flow between the four focus areas. Following the same example, a 
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Nature of the Capability 
Rapidly changing 
technology 
High benefit and value 
Commercial or govt 
unique 
Core or critical to meet 
mission 
Competitive 





Types of offerors: 




Need stable Team 
Experience or training 
needed: award term, 
ordering contracts, 
service contracts, and 
commercial procedure 
Changing force 








TINA,    SCA, ADA, 






Figure 6:   Emergent Model 
61 
commercial type item determines the use of FAR 12 procedures. The use of FAR 12 
procedures lowers the entry barriers to conducting business with the DOD. Therefore, 
the type of capability flows through to the establishment of the strategic purchasing 
relationship. 
Comparative Analysis of the Analytical Model 
This section contains two major parts, the analytical model and the comparative 
analysis. The model is a pictorial description of the phenomena regarding the research 
questions. The comparative analysis section discusses the results of the findings, of the 
case data, and of the comparison to the literature in support of each module of the model. 
Analytical Model. Selective coding was used for model building, which is the 
application of selected parts of the data. This was an iterative process, returning each 
time to the within case analysis, to the between case analysis, and to the literature. This 
part provides an overview of the master flow chart and presents three sub-charts. The 
master flow chart describes the overall award term strategic purchasing model. Three of 
the major modules explode into individual sub-charts. 
The master flow chart in figure 7 contains 13 modules. The first five modules 
leading to the sixth module identifies decision criteria for selecting the award term 
strategy. Specifically, modules three, four, and five are associated with the first research 
question regarding what is different about the capability being acquired that requires a 
strategic purchasing relationship. 
Module seven is associated with the fourth research question regarding what 
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acquisition corps experience or skills are insufficient then module eight directs the 
reviewer to proceed to figure 8. Figure 8 provides recommendations and guidance for 
developing the acquisition corps strategic purchasing skills. This figure is discussed in 
the comparative analysis part of this section. 
Module nine is associated with the second research question regarding the 
establishment of strategic purchasing relationships using the award term concept in the 
public procurement environment. Module nine directs the reviewer to proceed to figure 
9. Figure 9 provides a detailed plan for evaluating the controlling legal and regulatory 
authority and award term unique application. This figure is discussed in the comparative 
analysis part of this section. 
Module 10 is associated with the third research question regarding what is the 
nature of the DOD competitive market when using the award term incentive concept. 
Module 10 directs the reviewer to proceed to figure 10. Figure 10 identifies market 
advantages and disadvantages of implementing the award term incentive concept. 
Further, this figure provides a detailed plan for determining the competitive market. This 
figure is discussed in the comparative analysis part of this section. 
Module 11 directs executing the determined source selection procedures. Module 
12 directs establishing the contract using an award term incentive clause and an award 
term plan (ATP) using the AFMC award term guide which provides detailed examples. 
Further, the guide provides step-by-step instructions for administering the evaluation 
process identified by module 13. Modules 11 through 13 are identified as part of the 
model, but were not measured by this research. Therefore, modules 11 through 13 will 
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Comparative Analysis. The second part of this section provides a comparative 
analysis of the cases and of the literature associated with each of the modules of the 
master flow chart of the model. Further, this section provides a comparative analysis of 
the three sub-charts of the model. The results and findings for the model follows the four 
focus areas developed from the research questions. However, the order of the four focus 
areas follows the order from the master flow chart. 
Nature of the Capability. The first module of the master flow chart asks 
is a strategic relationship needed. From the literature review in Chapter n, if the item is 
determined generic or if the relationship is based on price then a strategic relationship is 
not needed (Cavinato, 1992; Fontenot & Wilson, 1997; Kraljic, 1983; and Paun 1997). 
Therefore, move to module two and do not use the award term incentive. 
Proceed through the award term decision criteria if the need for a strategic 
relationship is affirmative. The third module asks is the capability a core or near a core 
competency to execute mission critical efforts. The literature supports not implementing 
a strategic relationship for commodity capabilities, where the relationship focuses only on 
cost reduction efforts (Cavinato, 1992; Fontenot & Wilson, 1997; Kraljic, 1983; and 
Paun, 1997). In four cases studied, the capabilities are near a core competency in support 
of mission critical capabilities. For example, Case C provides long-haul network 
capability allowing pilot and crew training between multiple weapon system platforms in 
direct support of the Expeditionary Air Force deployment concept. Case E is a core 
competency, but is outsourced because of government reductions in capacity. 
The fourth module asks is there an on-going competitive nature for the capability. 
The DOD awards long term, sole source contracts for critical and distinctive capabilities 
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where there is not an on-going competitive market. It is not that the DOD is over 
specifying these items, but the nature of the capability is leading edge, military only 
technology. An example is the stealth technology for major weapon sy   stems. Some 
other type of incentive other than award term incentive should be considered for non- 
competitive distinctive and critical capabilities. The literature supports limiting the use 
of sole source, follow-on contracts by pricing the primary contract and all of the follow- 
on vehicles at the award of the initial contract (Heberling and Graham, 1993). The on- 
going competitive nature of the capability with the potential for the continuing the 
business relationship develops a competitive advantage for the buyer (Templin and 
Heberling, 1994 and Ellram, 1991). The capabilities for all five cases researched have an 
on-going competitive nature. This is supported by the fact that Case C's technology has a 
commercial application, Case E's service is commercially available, and Case A, B, and 
D's technology is of a commercial type. 
The fifth module asks does the high value of the relationship provide sufficient 
benefits to offset the cost of the relationship. The five cases' values ranged between 
$131.9 million and $10 billion over a 15-year period of performance. In all five cases, 
the potential savings from cost reductions, technology development, cycle time 
reductions, and quality improvements was determined to exceed the additional cost 
associated with establishing and maintaining a strategic purchasing relationship 
(Monczka et. al., 1998). The Chapter II literature review supports judiciously 
establishing strategic relationships where the value to the customer exceeds the cost of 
the relationship (Cavinato, 1992; Ellram and Edis, 1996; and Rand and Casbon, 1999). 
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Responding yes to the decision criteria modules results in a determination to 
employ the award term incentive for the acquisition at module six. Module seven asks if 
the acquisition corps is stable and has the strategic purchasing capabilities. If unsure of 
the answer, proceed to the eighth module, which directs the viewer to figure 8. 
Acquisition Corps' Capabilities. The first module of figure 8 is a 
restatement from the master flow chart. The second and third modules are 
recommendations regarding the identification and development of strategic purchasing 
skills within the acquisition corps. As cited in Chapter I, Mr. Gansler identified 
performance based service acquisition as the fastest growing procurement method in the 
DOD and as one of his highest priorities. However, the skills to accomplish this type of 
acquisition are not identified nor have the purchasing skills developed within the ranks of 
the remaining members of the acquisition corps. The literature identifies that the skills of 
the purchasing function must be congruent with the strategies of the organization 
(Freeman and Cavinato, 1990,7). Management must identify and "tailor its personnel 
skills to the needs of the total organization" (10). As supported by findings in the 
literature, management appears to be unaware of the importance of developing strategic 
purchasing skills (Farmer, 1978). 
The interviewees in the cases indicate they performed extensive research to gain 
the knowledge required for implementing the award term concept. Due to downsizing, 
the remaining members of the acquisition corps have less time to maintain currency with 
the changing regulations. Their inability to remain current is exemplified by the fact that 
following extensive research four out of the five cases inappropriately excluded the 
award term decision process from the disputes process in the award term clause. The 
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finding from this research recommends mandatory just-in-time training before 
implementing an award term strategy. 
The fourth module recommends management identify and commit a stable core 
IPT for the planning and implementation of strategic purchasing relationships. Phase 1 of 
the commercial supplier relationship model identifies forming a team with top 
management commitment as a factor for developing a successful relationship. Review of 
the literature in the development of this model identifies internal uncertainty as 
negatively influencing the development of the relationship (Ellram and Edis, 1996: 22). 
Case E received management support to maintain core IPT stability during the source 
selection. However, within a year from award of the contract the team experienced 
complete membership turnover. The other four cases report extreme instability in core 
IPT membership. In the four years since the start of acquisition planning for Case A, this 
program has had four different contracting officers, four different program managers, two 
different contract negotiators, and one engineer. Since award of the contract, the Term 
Determining Official (TDO) for the award term has changed twice. The interviewees in 
the other four indicate instability impacts efficiency and effectiveness in implementing a 
strategic purchasing relationship. 
The fifth module directs the IPT to identify acquisition specific training needs. 
As there is no DOD regulatory guidance for award term, Air Force personnel should 
review the AFMC Award Term Guide, as well as, the training briefing provided at the 
web site within module 6. The guide provides an example of the award term clause and a 
detailed plan for developing and executing the award term plan. If this guidance had 
previously existed then four out of the five cases would not have exempted the award 
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term decision from the disputes process. Module seven identifies a National Contract 
Management Association one-day seminar on award term contracting as another source 
of training. Module eight records the completion of award term training. 
The AFMC Award Term Guide identifies the ID/requirements and ID/IQ 
contractual vehicles as the most appropriate types when implementing the award term 
concept (AFMC, 2000). Module nine requests the IPT to identify the need for this 
training. A few of the acquisition professionals interviewed had experience or training in 
the use of ordering contracts. All other interviewees prior experience and training was in 
the use of definitive contracts. Module 10 records the completion of ID requirements or 
ID/IQ training. The training for these types of ordering contracts is more extensive than 
award term and is outside the scope of this research. 
Module 11 requests the IPT to identify other skills needed for the specific 
acquisition. Information from the cases indicates the acquisition corps does not have 
adequate experience or training in services and commercial contracting procedures. The 
AFMC product centers procurement focus is in the acquisition and maintenance of 
government unique major weapon systems and subsystems. AFMC has not focused on 
the acquisition of services or commercial type items. 
Module 12 records the completion of commercial acquisition procedures training. 
FASA's redefinition of commercial to be of a type, not necessarily commercially 
available, increases the likelihood that procurements using the award term strategy will 
be following commercial procedures. Cases A, B, D, and E employed commercial 
procedures with the award term strategy. Of those four cases, only Case B indicates 
receiving training in commercial contracting procedures and assesses the training as 
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inadequate because the experience base does not exist in the government. The 
interviewees insinuated that the trainers lacked actual experience and were unable to 
provide the level of detail needed to develop this strategic purchasing skill. The training 
for commercial procedures is more extensive than award term and is outside the scope of 
this research. 
Module 13 records the completion of service acquisition training. Using award 
term in conjunction with the procurement of supplies is acceptable. However, all five of 
the cases are for the procurement of services. Only Cases C and E acquisition 
professional had any experience using service contracts. The newly appointed 
contracting officer for Case B has service contracting experience, but the prior 
contracting officer did not. Inadequate training resulted in the misapplication and 
misinterpretation of the SCA five-year length limitation. Cases A, B, and D misapplied 
the SCA five year performance limitation and plans to mechanically limit the number of 
terms on the contract at any given time. Even if the supplier has earned additional terms, 
terms will not be added until only four terms remain on the contract. The training for 
service contracting procedures is more extensive than award term and is outside the scope 
of this research. 
The interview information indicates that implementing the award term concept 
using the newly available training is not difficult. However, without the related 
purchasing skills, acquisition professionals report loss of efficiency and effectiveness to 
plan and implement the award term strategic relationship. Therefore, the finding of the 
research recommends management identify as a top priority the development of ordering, 
of commercial procedures, and of service purchasing skills within the acquisition corps 
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under the strategy purchasing skills module three. Module 14 directs returning to the 
master flow chart at module 9. 
Legal and Regulatory Environment.   The ninth module of the master 
flow chart directs the viewer to figure 9. The first module identifies that figure 9 
provides a detailed plan for evaluating the controlling legal and regulatory authority with 
award term unique application. The second module identifies that the appropriation type 
matches the length of the award term extensions or reductions. It is important to 
understand that the constitution provides that "...no money shall be drawn from the 
Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law" (Steamer, 1992). All five of 
the cases provide extensions in the same length as the appropriation type. This helps 
ensure the order periods will match the appropriation type. 
The third module identifies the use of ID requirements and ID/IQ contractual 
vehicles assist program administrators to avoid Anti-deficiency Act (ADA) violations. 
Single award "ID/IQ and requirements contracts allow additional contract terms to be 
added without committing future fiscal year budget before it is appropriated" (AFMC, 
2000:8) These two contractual vehicles avoid violating the ADA because the government 
does not incur an obligation until the order is issued. However, the ID/IQ does obligate 
the government to order the minimum order quantity to establish consideration for 
contract establishment (FAR, 2000:16.5). The ID requirements contract incurs no 
minimum obligation as exclusivity of the contractual arrangement establishes contractual 
consideration. These contractual arrangements are used "when a recurring need is 
anticipated" (16.5). All five of the researched cases use these two contractual vehicles to 
reduce the risk of an ADA violation. 
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The fourth module identifies the need to ensure the contract is clear that the 
government's obligation with regard to award term extensions is conditioned upon the 
availability of funds or availability of funds for the next fiscal year clauses. All of the 
contract cases incorporate these clauses to help avoid ADA violations. The AFMC 
guidance is consistent with this recommendation (AFMC, 2000:8). 
The fifth module identifies the requirement to comply with the CICA at 41 U.S.C. 
253 and with the FAR part 6 requirements. CICA requires contracting officers to 
promote and to provide for full and open competition in soliciting offers and awarding 
public contracts. The sixth module asks if this is a competitive acquisition. If not 
competitive then move to module seven and process a sole source J&A to include all the 
award terms (FAR, 2000:6). If this is a competitive acquisition, move to module eight 
and answer if all the award terms were competed. If not, move to module nine and 
process a class J&A to defmitize the award terms in a sole source environment (6). All of 
the award term periods are competitively awarded in four of the cases. Case C has a class 
J&A pending to defmitize the award terms in a sole source environment. 
Modules seven, eight, and nine proceed to module ten, which asks if the 
procurement is a supply or a service. If this is a service, module 11 notifies the viewer 
that the contract term is not limited to 5 years. This is consistent with the understanding 
of the contracting officer in Case C and an iterative review of the literature. Specifically, 
James Barager's, Col, USAF, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Contracting) Assistant 
Secretary (Acquisition), understanding of the Services Contract Act (SCA) is the 
rendition of services beyond the five years for an additional period for effort not included 
in the original five year base period is considered a wholly new contract (Barager, 1992). 
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This understanding is with respect to the application of Section 4 (d) of the Act's 
provision. Deputy Assistant Administrator of the US Department of Labor(DOL), Mr. 
Daniel Sweeney, confirms this understanding as long as no single extension period if 
greater than five years (Sweeney, 1992). Cases E and C are for services but the type of 
effort is not subject to the SCA. Cases A, B, and D are subject to the SCA and have 
included the appropriate FAR clauses and attached the DOL wage determinations to the 
contract as indicated in module 12. However, the interviewees indicate they are limiting 
the addition of award terms to no more than five years at any given time in order to 
comply with the five year limitation. The acquisition professionals for three cases are 
unaware of the DOL's interpretation that extensions are not subject to a five-year 
limitation. 
From module 12 or module 10, module 13 asks if the capability is government 
unique. If yes, proceed to modules 14 and 15 to conduct source selection using 
negotiated procedures with multiple contract types available for implementation (FAR, 
2000:15 and 16). Case C's contract used the negotiated procedures with cost 
reimbursement, time and material, and firm-fixed price (FFP) contract types. If this 
procurement is a commercial type then proceed to modules 16 and 17. The controlling 
regulation is the FAR 12 procedures with FFP or FFP with economic price adjustment 
(EPA) type contracts (12 and 16). "Including an economic price adjustment clause helps 
mitigate the inherent risk in longer term pricing commitments," (AFMC, 2000:8). Cases 
A, B, D, and E were FAR 12 procurements using FFP EPA type contracts. 
Module 18 identifies the requirement to include a termination for convenience (T- 
for-C) of the government clause and other government unique clauses. While the AFMC 
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guide discusses the affect of T-for-C using award fee, it does not provide a discussion 
regarding T-for-C using award term (AFMC, 2000:36). However, the NCMA Award 
Term Contracting Seminar identifies that the T-for-C "will probably affect the 
motivational power of the award term incentive" (NCMA, 2000: 2-13). All of the cases 
incorporate the T-for-C and other government unique clauses. An example of a 
government unique clause was used in Case C. To be considered for award, the offerors 
had to agree to the inclusion of an organizational conflict of interest (OCI) clause. This 
clause is required because the supplier for Case C is establishing standards and defines 
the network interface requirements for the other simulation service suppliers. Further, the 
network supplier can be a technical advisor in future simulation services source 
selections. 
Module 19 identifies program unique clause. A program unique clause for Case 
C is the Defense Information Service Network (DISN) clause. This clause allows the 
Government to direct the supplier to provided the connectivity using DISN. The change 
would to be negotiated using this clause as the authority. Another example of a program 
unique clause is found in Case E, which includes a workload volume guarantee allowing 
the supplier to submit a request for equitable adjustment if the volume changes greater 
than plus or minus 25 percent. The most notable program unique clause in all five cases 
is the award term clause. The AFMC award term guidance now provides suggested 
language for an award term clause, which is provided in Chapter II at table 1 of this 
document. 
Module 20 identifies that the award term decision is subject to the Contract 
Disputes Act. Based on review of the literature from a Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
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decision and on the similarities between the award fee and the award term concepts, the 
award term decision is subject to the CDA (Burnside-ott, 1997, FAR 1997, and FAR 
2000). However, four out of the five cases exempted the award term decision from the 
disputes process in the award term clause. Module 21 directs returning to the master flow 
chart at module 10. 
Nature of the DOD Competitive Market. The tenth module of the 
master flow chart directs the viewer to figure 10. The first module identifies that figure 
10 provides a detailed plan for determining the competitive market when using the award 
term concept. The second module asks are there market advantages or disadvantages 
when using award term incentive. The third module identifies that using the award term 
incentive increases the strength of the competition. Because of the potential for earning a 
continuing business relationship, the interviewees in all five cases indicate that 
competition was increased.   For example, teams of suppliers competed for the award in 
all five cases in order to gain competitive advantages of the skills of the combined team. 
The literature of Ellram asserts that partnerships will be a source of competitive 
advantage in most industries (Ellram, 1991). 
The fourth module identifies that an advantage to implementing the award term 
incentive is reducing the potential for suppliers to buy-in. All five cases believe the 
pricing or NTE pricing of the award terms reduces the potential of a buy -in. The 
literature of Heberling and Graham supports findings that by pricing the follow-on effort 
at award of the initial contract reduces buy-ins (Heberling and Graham 1993). 
The fifth module identifies that an advantage to implementing the award term 
incentive is reducing the suppliers' future bid and proposal cost. Further, potential source 
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selection cost and time savings are forecasted for both the government and the supplier. 
This is supported by the transaction cost literature reviewed in Chapter II (Center for 
Strategies and International Studies, 1993 and Templin, 1994). 
The sixth module identifies that using the award term incentive decreases the 
strength of the competition. After losing a competition with an award term incentive, 
suppliers may abandon the DOD market. Suppliers may come to believe that the loss of 
a long-term contract essentially shuts them out of this market. "The consequent reduction 
in competitive vigor in the market could lead to higher prices or costs for services, or to 
poorer quality performance" (NCMA, 2000: 2-4). 
The seventh module identifies that using the award term incentive increases the 
supplier's technical and financial risk. Commercial suppliers are guaranteed a revenue 
stream, which encourages capital investment. Appropriation law does not allow the 
government to guarantee revenue streams. Except for Case E where the public offeror is 
the supplier, suppliers have increased financial risk. Increased supplier technical risk to 
maintain concurrency or technical order changes was found in all the cases. All the cases 
identify the nature of the longer-term relationship also increases technical and financial 
risk on the supplier. 
The eighth module identifies the DOD legal and regulatory environment as a 
disadvantage that decreases the strength of the competition. Gansler finds that the 
invisible hand of the market may not work for even the most standard commercial items. 
Some competitors can not be bothered with the red tape imposed by the regulations 
(Gansler, 1989). Templin finds there are transaction cost associated with proposal 
preparation and with source selection activities, which increase significantly as the 
79 
number of unique requirements increase (Templin, 1994). Transaction cost increase for 
the suppliers to DOD contracts because of the vast number of unique acquisition laws and 
regulations. An example from the cases is the OCI clause in Case C. Research found the 
OCI clause caused potential offerors not to propose because it would limit future 
simulation services opportunities. 
The ninth module identifies that the increase in the initial bid and proposal cost 
and the additional cost and time to support the DOD source selection process decreases 
the strength of the competition. One comparison from the literature found it is five times 
more expensive to propose on defense solicitations than commercial invitations (Center 
for Strategies and International Studies, 1993). Case E reports that several potential 
suppliers chose not to propose or to join a team of suppliers because of the large cost of 
proposing. 
The AFMC guidance states, "determining when and how to apply award term 
requires a thorough understanding of the market and the acquisition situation," (AFMC, 
2000: 7). The results of this research identifies several questions to help acquisition 
professional define the DOD competitive market. Module 10 asks if there is a 
commercial market for the capability. Module 14 asks if the capability is a commercial 
type. Modules 11, 15, and 18 ask if there are high entry barriers to the market. An entry 
barrier is an action or condition that prevents other firms from entering the market. 
Depending on the answers to these questions, modules 12, 13, 16, 17, 19, and 20 identify 
the expected number of suppliers in the market, the expected sizes of the supplier firms, 
and the expected suppliers' past DOD experience. 
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If the capability to be acquired is commercially available with low entry barriers 
then the acquisition professional should expect a larger number of suppliers, consisting of 
large or small businesses, and DOD or Non-DOD suppliers. The described market 
conditions in module 12 exist for Case C. Although, Case C had a few government 
unique aspects, the network technology is commercially available with low entry barriers. 
If the capability to be acquired is commercially available with high entry barriers 
then acquisition professionals should expect a smaller number of suppliers, consisting of 
large businesses, and DOD or Non-DOD suppliers. Market conditions described in 
module 13 are the market conditions for Case E. Case E had a few government unique 
aspects, the engine maintenance technology is commercially available with high entry 
barriers. The entry barriers include a skillful and knowledgeable workforce, license 
maintainer by the original equipment manufacturer, and facilities and equipment 
acquisition. 
If the capability to be acquired is not commercially available, is of a commercial 
type, and has low entry barriers then acquisition professionals should expect a large 
number of suppliers. However, the number of suppliers would be less than that of 
suppliers whose capabilities have a commercial market. The expected market consists of 
large or small businesses, and DOD or Non-DOD suppliers. This is the market condition 
for module 16. 
If the capability to be acquired is not commercially available, is of a commercial 
type and has high entry barriers then acquisition professionals should expect a small 
number of suppliers. The expected market consists of large businesses, and DOD or 
Non-DOD suppliers. The market conditions described in module 17 are the market 
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conditions for Cases A and D. Case A's and D's technology is for pilot training services 
is commercially available for government unique application with high entry barriers. 
The entry barriers include government controlled simulation certification and high initial 
capital investment. 
If the capability to be acquired is not commercially available, is not of a 
commercial type, and has low entry barriers then acquisition professionals should expect 
a small number of suppliers. However, the number of supplier would be less than those 
of suppliers whose capabilities have a commercial market or are of a commercial type. 
The expected market consists of large or small businesses, and DOD suppliers. The 
describe market conditions describe in module 19 are the market conditions for Case B. 
Although the capability was determined to be of a commercial type, the current 
contracting officer could not understand how this was determined. There is not a 
commercial market for this type of mission crew training or a known type of commercial 
mission crew training service.   Case B is a government mission crew simulation service. 
While pilot simulation technology is commercially available, there is no commercial 
equivalent mission crew training. The entry barriers were low. The initial capital 
investment is lower than pilot simulation services and does not require flight-worthy 
simulation certification. However, the government unique capability requires knowledge 
of the aircraft platform. 
If the capability to be acquired is not commercially available, is not of a 
commercial type, and has high entry barriers then acquisition professionals should expect 
a small number of suppliers. The expected market consists of large businesses, DOD 
suppliers. This is the market condition for module 20. Module 21 directs the viewer 
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back to block 11 of the master flow chart. The remaining modules of the master flow 
chart are as previously described. 
Summary 
This chapter presented an overview of the data collected and analyzed, briefly 
introduced the within case analysis, and presented the between case analysis with an 
emergent model. The majority of this chapter was devoted to the presentation of the 
analytical model developed from this research and to the comparative analysis of the 
model. Chapter V presents the significant conclusions drawn from this analysis, the 
limitations of this research, and recommendations for future research. 
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
This research was undertaken in response to the problem statement that there is no 
FAR coverage or DOD guidance for establishing the award term incentive and the 
commercial model does not address DOD unique factors. The purpose of this research 
was to identify and examine the nature of the factors for establishing and implementing 
the award term incentive strategy in DOD suppler relationships. Further, the objective of 
this research was to develop an award term incentive model to assist DOD acquisition 
professionals in formulating strategic purchasing relationships. 
The framework for the case studies was developed around four research questions 
that were derived from a review of the strategic purchasing literature. The analytical 
model developed from this research is consistent with the AFMC guide. Further, the 
analytical model expands the guidance of the AFMC guide. It is clear from the 
anecdotal, archival, and literature evidence that guidance is needed for effective and 
efficient implementation of the award term, performance-based strategy. 
Strategic Purchasing Conclusions 
Implementation of best commercial practices is streamlining the DOD 
procurement process. However, it is necessary to recognize that development and 
execution of a strategic purchasing relationship is more labor intensive than arms-length 
transaction relationships. It is apparent from a review of the literature and from the study 
of the cases that top management and the acquisition corps needs a greater understanding 
of strategic purchasing relationships in order to implement the award term incentive 
judiciously. 
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Nature of the Capability. The type of capability being acquired is different from 
DOD's past acquisitions. The DOD is buying capabilities that are core competencies or 
near core competencies for achieving mission critical activities. The Government is 
purchasing these capabilities in the form of performance-based services. We no longer 
own the assets or own the facilities and equipment in support of the assets. The 
capabilities researched are of an on-going competitive nature. The capabilities are of a 
commercial type as defined by FASA or are available commercially to varying degrees. 
These capabilities provide access to risk reducing, leading edge technologies. The 
capabilities are of a high dollar value, where the additional cost of the relationship is 
offset by the value of the benefits. 
Acquisition Corps' Capabilities. Mr. Gansler identifies performance-based 
service acquisition as the fastest growing method of procurement in the DOD and as one 
of his highest priorities. However, identifying the strategic purchasing skills or 
implementing a strategic purchasing skills development program to accomplish these 
types of acquisitions has not previously occurred. The literature and this research 
identify that the skills of the purchasing function must be congruent with the strategies of 
the organization. 
The past structure of the acquisition workforce within AFMC has resulted in 
specialization of procurement skills for systems and subsystems supplies. This segment 
of the workforce does not have the necessary experience and training in service 
procurements, in order contracting procedures, or in commercial acquisition processes to 
effectively and efficiently implement the related award term incentive contracting tool. 
Further, implementation and administration of the contractual relationship using the 
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award term incentive tool is impacted by the DOD's base closure and downsizing efforts. 
This research identifies that IPT instability results in a loss of efficiency and of 
effectiveness within the acquisition corps. 
Legal and Regulatory Environment. The entire DOD acquisition process is still 
under going changes to identify, capture, and implement best commercial practices to 
manage our supply chain. The award term concept is not covered by regulation and has 
not been subject to litigation at this time. When implementing an award term incentive 
strategy, it is important for the team to consider the impact of government unique laws 
and regulations. This research results in a detailed plan for evaluating the controlling 
legal and regulatory authority with award term unique application. 
The complex and dynamic nature of the legal and regulatory environment requires 
special attention in implementing the award term incentive. To avoid ADA violations, the 
acquisition professionals must understand appropriation law in selecting the contractual 
vehicle and clauses for an award term contract. Complying with CICA requires 
competitive pricing of potential award terms or a J&A for sole source pricing. The 
current interpretation of the SCA does not limit award terms to five years. The 
acquisition corps must remain current with implications of changes in laws and 
regulations. For example, a Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that no contract 
term or condition may limit a suppliers access to the disputes process. Therefore, the 
award term clause cannot exempt an award term decision from the disputes process. 
Nature of the DOD Competitive Market. Implementation of the award term 
incentive strategy affects the nature of the DOD market. Advantages of implementing 
this strategic purchasing method includes: increasing the strength of the competition, 
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reducing the potential for supplier buy-in, reducing supplier future bid and proposal cost, 
and reducing future source selection cost and time. Disadvantages of implementing this 
strategic purchasing method includes: decreasing the strength of future competition, 
increasing supplier financial and technical risk, limiting competition from the DOD legal 
and regulatory environment, increasing the instant procurement bid and proposal cost, 
and increasing the instant source selection cost and time. 
This research results in a detailed plan for determining the competitive market. 
Although the supply or service may be commercially available or categorized as a 
commercial type, the government unique aspects of the supply or service influences the 
number, the size, and the type of company's willing to do business with the DOD. 
Government market entry barriers also influenced suppliers' competitiveness for DOD 
procurements. 
Limitations 
This research is limited by the exploratory nature of the subject area. Prior to this 
research, there were only commercial models describing the planning and the 
implementation process for strategic purchasing. The data available for identifying and 
examining the nature of the factors for establishing and implementing the award term 
incentive strategy in DOD suppler relationships was confined to Air Force AFMC 
programs and personnel. Unfortunately, these data sources limit the validity of the 
research. 
The research is limited in that it does not represent the full scope of the 
participants in the award term process. Interview data from suppliers may be 
forthcoming as the execution of the award term incentive strategy gains acceptance. 
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Expanded data sources would increase the validity of this research. Further, examining 
data from only one Air Force Command limits the ability to generalize the conclusions of 
this research to other Air Force Commands and to other military services. 
A single researcher conducted these case studies. Potential for researcher bias 
exists. Evaluation of these cases by another researcher using the same protocol would 
increase the reliability of the conclusions drawn from the findings. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
A goal of this exploratory research was to develop a model for acquisition 
professionals to use in the planning and the implementation of the award term strategic 
purchasing tool. The resulting model should be submitted to AFMC in hopes of eliciting 
comments to improve the model for incorporation into the AFMC Award Term Guide. 
Further, the results of this exploratory study should be submitted to the NCMA to share 
this body of knowledge with the contracting community. This study provides a 
foundation for expanding the NCMA Award Term Contracting seminar to include a 
discussion of strategic purchasing, of the acquisition corps' capability needs, and of the 
DOD competitive environment. 
The limitations previously discussed provide several recommendations for future 
research. Future research should include a validation of the preliminary findings of this 
research. This could include an analysis of the same cases and protocol used in this 
research effort. Other future research could include an analysis of these cases with an 
expansion to include other cases from other military services to increase the ability to 
generalize the findings. 
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Related research areas not addressed by this research effort include: identifying 
methods for determining the value of the strategic purchasing relationship, identifying 
methods for evaluating award term in source selection, and identifying the factors for 
executing the award term evaluation process. Researching methods for determining the 
value of the strategic purchasing relationship includes the identification of the cost and 
benefit factors. This research would develop a mathematical model for use in the 
cost/benefit analysis determination. 
Currently, source selection procedures do not provide for the dollarization of the 
probability of the contract being extended by the award term incentive. The award term 
periods are evaluated with the assumption that all award terms priced will be earned. 
This research would develop a mathematical model for use in the source selection 
decision. However, this potential research would have to include an examination of the 
controlling laws and regulations. 
The AFMC Award Term Guide provides excellent instruction for the 
development of award term plans and for the execution of the supplier performance 
evaluation process. While intuitively appealing, the actual effectiveness of previously 
implemented contractual incentives such as award fee is anecdotal. Future research 
should include an empirical study of the effectiveness of the award term incentive. 
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Appendix A: First Telephone Contact with Primary Point Of Contact 
Introduction 
Rachael Harris 
Master student at AFIT 
Also a Contracting Officer at ASC Wright Patterson AFB 
First Conversation 
...this is regarding research I'm conducting on the award term incentive 
"If you have the time now, I'd like to tell you a little more about my research. 
Would you be willing to allow me to visit your office (or schedule a time), talk with you 
and some of your colleges, and use the information as part of my master research?" 
I got your name and number from Maj Vincent Feck of AFMC/PKP. He 
indicated you are working with a contract that has an award term incentive. 
About the Research 
This research is to identify how to establish a long-term relationship using the 
newest performance base strategy. I would like to compare your experience using award 
term with other acquisition professionals. 
Research Objective 
Identify and examine the nature of the factors in DOD for implementing this 
strategic relationship. From this information, I hope to develop a model to assist others 
using the award term concept. 
What I Require 
I will e-mail you an interview guideline that will include the questions and the 
interview process. 
1. Meet with you and your colleges to review your contract files for strategy and award 
term documents. 
2. Background on the program and the acquisition professionals using the award term. 
3. Nature of the capability you are procuring 
4. What the competitive market was for your program 
5. How you are applying the laws and regulations 
6. What kind of turnover rate has the team experienced 
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I expect that we'll spend a few hours talking, followed by me reading documents or 
reviewing my notes. Please set aside time for any follow-up questions. 
Particulars 
Date and time of visit or teleconference 
Thank you so much for you help. 
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Appendix B: Interview Guidelines 
Background Information 
Name   
Organization^ 
Job Title 
Years in Position 
Years in Organization 
Years in Acquisition  
Interview Questions 
The following questions provide information the researcher sought through the interview. 
1. What is the capability or function that is being procured using award term 
incentives? 
2. Is the item unique to DOD? 
3. What are the risk and criticality of the capability or function? 
4. Is this function being outsourced? If yes, is this function considered a near 
core competency and why is it being outsourced? 
5. What contract type was used and why? 
6. How does the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) at 41 U.S.C. 253 
and FAR subpart 6 affect the solicitation, selection, and management of 
the award term incentive process? CICA requires contracting officers to 
promote and to provide for full and open competition in soliciting offers 
and awarding public contracts. 
7. How does the Service Contract Act at (4) U.S.C. 353 (d) which provides 
that contracts that are subject to the Act may not exceed 5 years affect the 
solicitation, selection, and management of the award term incentive? 
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8. How does the Anti-deficiency Act affect the solicitation, selection, and 
management of the award term incentive process? Specifically, what is the 
affect of Government unique appropriations, authorizations, and funding 
limitations? 
9. How does the Truth-in-Negotiations Act affect the solicitation, selection, 
and management of the award term incentive process? 
10. What other laws or regulations that affect the solicitation, selection, and 
management of the award term incentive process? 
11. Were any unique terms and conditions incorporated in the contract? If 
yes, what and why? 
12. What characterized the market for this acquisition? 
13. Did the supplier operate in a competitive market? 
14. Did the supplier have a competitive edge? 
15. Does the solicitation or the contract contain organizational conflict of 
interest provisions? If yes, why was it necessary? Did it affect the 
competitive market? 
16. Was there a potential for a buy-in? 
17. What steps, if any, were taken to prevent a buy-in? 
18. What role did the participant play in the case? 
19. How long has the participant served in the current position? 
20. How much experience does the participant have in related areas? 
21. Has the participant used an award term incentive before? 
22. How often are team members transferred? 
23. Has the Term Determination Official changed since award of the contract? 
24. Has the participate received or provided award term incentive training? 
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Method of Data Collection 
In addition to discussions with acquisition team members , I will review whatever 
documentation you can provide such as the acquisition plan, solicitation, award term 
incentive contract provision, award term performance evaluation plan, and buyer/supplier 
correspondence. 
I will set aside two mornings (0800-1200) for the face-to-face or telephone 
interview. After the initial discussion, I will review whatever written materials you can 
provide. Follow on discussions will address questions that may arise from this review. 
For the validity and reliability of this research, I must address all the above 
questions.   However, discussions will be allowed to take their natural course according 
to the availability of respondents, information, and documentation. 
Follow-up 
It will likely be necessary for me to make follow-up calls to respondents to clarify 
information during the data analysis process. To ensure accuracy on the part of the 
researcher, once the case is written-up it will be sent to the respondents for review prior 
to publication. 
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Core 1 Core or Near Core for Critical Mission or Commodity 
Value 1,3 High Cost Benefit Tradeoff for Value of Contract 
CC 1,3 Changing Concurrency 
CT 1,3 Changing Technology 
CTO 1,3 Changing Technical Orders 
ROAsset 1 Replaces owning asset 
Sub Asset 1 Substitute for owned asset 
ROFE 1 Replaces Owning Facility and Equipment 
Ser 1,2,4 Service 
Comm 1,2,3,4 Commercial 
Uniq 1,2,3 Govt Unique Requirement 
Comp 1,2,3 Competitive 
SCA 2,4 Services Contract Act 
FAR 12 2,4 Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 12 Acquisition of 
Commercial Items 
FAR 15 2,4 Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 15 Contracting by 
Negotiation 
Mult-KT 2,3,4 Multiple Contract Types 
Lim-KT 2,3,4 Limited Contract Types (Firm Fixed Price or FFP with 
EPA) 
NTEP 2,4 Not To Exceed Pricing 
EP 2 Established Pricing 
TFNA 2 Truth In Negotiations Act 
CICA 2,4 Competition in Contracting Act 
CJ&A 2,4 Class Justification and Approval 
OCI 2,3 Organizational Conflict of Interest 
TforC 2 Termination for Convenience 
ADA 2,4 Anti-Deficiency Act 
A-Fund 2,4 Availability of Funds Clause 
A-Appro 2,4 Annual Appropriation 
ID/Req 2,4 Indefinite Delivery Requirements Contractual Vehicle 
ID/IQ 2,4 Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity Contractual Vehicle 
SBA 2 Small Business Administration 
PPC 2 Public Private Competition 
SB/SDB Plan 2 Small Business and Small Disadvantage Business Plan 
Dis-A 2,4 Disputes Act 
UniqTC 2,4 Unique Terms and Conditions 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Cont-Bus 2,3,4 Potential for Continued Business 
F-B&P 3 Reduced Future Bid and Proposal Cost 
Fin-R 3 Financial Risk 
Tech-R 3 Technical Risk 
I-B&P 3 Increased Instant Bid and Proposal Cost 
R-Buyin 3 Reduced Potential for Buy-in 
Leg Reg 2,3 DOD Legal and Regulatory Environment 
Sm#Sup 3 Small Number of Suppliers 
Lg#Sup 3 Large Number of Suppliers 
LgBus 3 Large Business 
SmBus 3 Small Business 
LgBusT 3 Team of Large Businesses 
SmBusT 3 Team of Small Businesses 
DODSup 3 DOD Supplier 
PubSup 3 Public Supplier 
ComBusB 3,4 Commercial Business Base 
NcomMkt 3,4 No Commercial Market 
HSC 3 High Start-up Cost 
LKB 3 Labor Knowledge Barrier 
DP 4 Downsizing Promotion 
BC 4 Base Closure Personnel Moves 
PR 4 Position Eliminated in Downsizing 
CT 2,4 Commercial Acquisition Procedures Training 
OT 2,4 Order Contract Training 
ST 2,4 Services Contract Training 
AT 2,4 Award Term Incentive Training 
CE 2,4 Commercial Acquisition Procedures Experience 
OE 2,4 Order Contract Experience 
SE 2,4 Services Contract Experience 
AE 2,4 Award Term Incentive Experience 
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Appendix D: Within Case Analysis 
This appendix consists of the complete results of all five within case analysis. 
Each section addresses only the information gathered from that particular program. The 
within case analyses are addressed in no particular order of importance. The presentation 
of each of the within cases follows a uniform and set format. Each case is divided into a 
background section and into four focus sections. The background section provides 
general information about each program, the dollar value of the acquisition, the contract 
length, and the experience level of the contracting professionals. The four focus sections 
are Nature of the Capability Purchased, Legal and Regulatory Environment, Nature of the 
DOD Competitive Market, Acquisition Corps' Capabilities. These sections were 
developed from the four research questions. The information in the four focus sections 
was open-coded using concept/mind-mapping techniques (Novak, 1998:27 and Buzan & 
Buzan, 1994:139). A pictorial representation of the resulting map is presented for each 
within case analysis. 
Case A 
Background. This program is for the acquisition of simulation services where 
the supplier maintains ownership of the system. The supplier is responsible for 
maintaining system concurrency with the aircraft and for all logistics support of the 
system. During acquisition planning, the estimated cost of this program was $806 
million. It was determined the benefits of the relationship exceeded the cost of 
implementing the relationship. This basic contract is for 7 years with 2 years lead-time to 
the commencement of the minimum of 5 years of simulation services. The contract 
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provides for 8 annual award term periods that can potentially be earned by the supplier 
for a potential contract length of 15 years. Previously earned award term periods may 
also be lost based on evaluated supplier performance. Assigned to the program for 2 
years, the contracting officer for this case has 16 years of acquisition experience. 
Assigned to the program for 2 years, the contract negotiator for this case has 5 years on 
contracting experience. Case A's mind map is at figure 11. 
Nature of the Capability. The pilot training simulation service is provided on an 
individual simulator and is linked locally to same aircraft type simulators. The service 
provides the capability to be linked long haul through a network provider to other same 
aircraft type simulators and to be linked long haul through a network provider to different 
aircraft type simulators. These services were determined to be of a commercial type and 
procured under FAR Part 12. However, there is no other customer for this service except 
DOD (FMS is not buying the service). This is because of the unique training required 
such as flying in formation, air to air tactical mission training, and evasive maneuvers. 
There does not currently exist tactical training except in the aircraft. 
This simulation service reduces the risk associated with training in the 
aircraft. In fact, some training will be completed solely in the simulator because of the 
high risk of training the maneuvers in the aircraft. Part of this type of training was 
completed in the aircraft and some of the training requirements never existed before. 
Previously the government owned the trainers, now the simulation service is contracted 
out. The interviewees indicated that having trained pilots to fly missions is near the AF 


















































Figure 11: Case A Open Coded Mind Map 
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The suppliers have the technical expertise to provide the pilot training. By 
removing the government from the process, the supplier can implement concurrency 
upgrades much faster as the manpower is no longer available to manage this activity. 
Further, development and procurement money is not available to meet the new 
requirement. 
Legal and Regulatory Environment. The service for Case A was determined to 
be of a commercial type. This determination in turn induced the use of FAR part 12 
acquisition procedures. FAR 12 requires agencies to use (FFP) contracts or fixed-price 
contracts with economic price adjustment (EPA) for the acquisition of commercial items. 
Use of any other contract type to acquire commercial items is prohibited by this 
regulation. A FFP type contract was awarded using an indefinite delivery requirements 
contractual vehicle. 
The budget is very limited for this program. To avoid violating the Anti- 
deficiency Act (ADA), the contracting officer decided not to use an EPA. Even if the 
service had not been a commercial type, the use of annual 3400 appropriations makes it 
too risky for the government to award any cost type contract. Further, the nature of a 
requirements contract imposes no obligation on the Government to order any services. 
The basis of consideration for contract formation is the government's promise to acquire 
these services only from the awarded supplier. An ADA violation as the result of a 
termination for convenience is avoided using contractual language limiting recover of 
cost only on orders issued and not on terms earned without orders issued. Further, the 
contract contains an availability of funds clause. 
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To comply with the Competition in Contracting Act, the IPT for Case A solicited, 
evaluated, and awarded priced services for all 15 years. The interviewees indicated that 
without firm pricing for the entire contract period of performance the same justification 
and approval needed to award a sole source contract would have to be secured before 
granting the award term extension. 
The acquisition planning for this program includes the application of the Services 
Contract Act (SCA) which provides for wage adjustments and limits the contract to 5 
years. Price adjustments will be made based on union negotiate rates for the technicians. 
The IPT is mechanically controlling the total length of the award term extensions that are 
on contract at any point in time. There will never be more than 5 years of performance 
on contract at anyone time. As years of performance are used up then more are added or 
subtracted base on evaluation of supplier performance. This was coordinated with the 
AFMC Department of Labor (DOL) Liaison Representative and the Secretary of the Air 
Force Staff Judge Advocate Generals (SAF/JAG) office. 
As this was a competitive procurement that was conducted under FAR 12 no 
certified cost and pricing data or information other than cost and pricing data was 
required during source selection. At the time of award of this contract, the government 
was prohibited from requiring certified cost and pricing data under the Truth in 
Negotiation Act for commercial items. However, in Case A no commercial market 
pricing data was available for this service. When pricing contract modifications for this 
service, it is difficult for the contracting officer to determine if the price is fair and 
reasonable. Because of the potential longer relationship afforded under the award term 
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provision, the supplier has voluntarily provided other than cost and pricing data as well as 
catalogue data if available to help support the changes process. 
Another regulation that affected this government acquisition included 
consideration of the small business requirements. The regulations required the EPT to 
gain approval from the Small Business Administration not to set-aside the competition to 
small or small disadvantaged businesses. Further, small business/small disadvantage 
business subcontracting plans were required to be submitted, evaluated, and 
administered. 
The contract awarded contains several special clauses or government unique 
terms and conditions. The most notable special clause is an award term clause allowing 
extensions or reductions to the performance period not subject to the Disputes Act. 
Second, a special deliveries and performance clause allowing technical insertion 
upgrades. Lastly, a system availability accounting clause allowing assignment of award 
term points for mean time between failure and the device availability rates that feeds into 
the performance evaluation of the award term for system availability. To win the award 
the supplier had to agree to the inclusion of the following government unique contract 
terms and conditions for commercial items under FAR 52.212-4(r )— 
1. comply with 31 U.S.C. 1352 relating to limitations on the use of appropriated 
funds to influence certain Federal contracts; 
2. 18 U.S.C. 431 relating to officials not to benefit; 
3. 40 U.S.C. 327, et seq., Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act; 
4. 41 U.S.C. 51-58, Anti-Kickback Act of 1986; 
5. 41 U.S.C. 265 and 10 U.S.C. 2409 relating to whistleblower protections; 
6. 49 U.S.C. 40118, Fly American; and 
7. 41 U.S.C. 423 relating to procurement integrity. 
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Nature of the DOD Competitive Market. Pilot simulation training service for 
commercial airlines can be acquired on an hourly basis. The number of suppliers of pilot 
training in the commercial market is small because of the FAA certification and annual 
re-certification requirements. The SAMP identifies there are several offerers interested 
in this competition. The number of suppliers for the simulation service acquired under 
Case A contained a few of the large DOD contractors. The AF certifies AF owned 
devices for training. The AF will remain the certification authority for the simulators that 
will provide the service acquired for Case A. 
There are high start-up costs to enter this market. The supplier must develop, 
integrate interoperability requirements, and produce the devices. The devices must be 
tested and certified before an order for the service is issued. Commercial suppliers are 
guaranteed a revenue stream for the simulation service. Appropriation law does not allow 
us this latitude. The interviewee indicated the supplier is at a tremendous financial risk. 
The supplier in Case A did have a competitive edge because they are the producer 
of the aircraft and have produced this type of simulator in the past. As the producer of the 
aircraft, the supplier will be able to maintain concurrency with the aircraft easier than 
another supplier could. 
Shifting the risk of concurrency responsibility to the supplier reduces the potential 
for buy-in. In the past, suppliers have been able to recoup cost through government 
requested change order modifications. Further, pricing the award term extensions reduces 
the potential for buy-in. Previously, suppliers have been able to get well from follow-on 
procurements. 
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Acquisition Corps' Capabilities. The interviewees were the previous contract 
negotiator and the current contracting officer/contract negotiator for Case A. 
The previous contract negotiator participated on the program for three years and had no 
prior experience buying services, using commercial procedures, or using ordering 
contracts.   The current contracting officer/contract negotiator has been working the 
program for eight months and had no prior experience buying services, using commercial 
procedures, or using ordering contracts. As the award term incentive concept is new, 
neither of these participates have any experience using award term. 
The core government IPT for Case A has experience extreme instability. In the 
four years since the start of acquisition planning, this program has had four different 
contracting officers, four different program managers, two different buyers, and one 
engineer. Since award of the contract, the Term Determining Official (TDO) for the 
award term has changed twice. It was indicated that downsizing required some IPT 
members to move to other inadequately staffed programs. Some IPT members left the 
program due to promotions into open positions left vacant from early retirements. 
The interviewees have not received or conducted training for the award term 
concept and related acquisition concepts other than the award term plan for the contract. 
Each of the TDO changes requires training of duties and responsibilities concerning the 
award term process. The Award Term Review Board (ATRB) members are assumed to 
understand the award term process, as they are familiar with the award fee process. 
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CaseB 
Background. This program is for the acquisition of mission crew simulation 
services where the supplier maintains ownership of the system. The supplier is 
responsible for maintaining system concurrency with the aircraft and for all logistics 
support of the system. At the time of acquisition planning, the estimated cost of this 
program was $131.9 million. It was determined the benefits of the relationship exceeded 
the cost of implementing the relationship. The basic contract is for 7 years with 8 annual 
award term periods that can potentially be earned by the supplier for a total of 15 years. 
Based on evaluated performance, the supplier can lose up to 2 years, of the original 7 
years, for a minimum of 5 years. Previously earned award term periods may also be lost 
based on evaluated supplier performance. Assigned to the program for 1 month, the 
contracting officer for this case has 15 years of acquisition experience. Assigned to the 
program for 2 years, the previous contracting officer for this case had 15 years of 
acquisition experience. Case B's mind map is at figure 12. 
Nature of the Capability. Mission crew simulation services are provided for 
multiple sites with a minimum of 14 crew stations and 7 instructor operator stations at 
each site. The service provides the capability to be linked long haul through a network 
provider to different aircraft type simulators. These services were determined to be of a 
commercial type and procured under FAR Part 12. However, there is not a commercial 
market for this type of mission training or a known type of commercial mission crew 
training service. 
The AF has identified the need for other aircraft mission crews to train with pilots 








































Figure 12: Case B Open Coded Mind Map 
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composite or inter-aircraft training. This type of training fits with in the concept of an 
Expeditionary Air Force (EAF). The interviewees indicated that having this training 
service is very near the core competency of conducting the AF mission. 
In the past, the government owned the simulators. There have been serious delays 
in acquiring concurrency upgrades due to budget cuts in development and procurement 
money. Now the supplier will own, operate, and upgrade concurrency as needed. 
Legal and Regulatory Environment. The service for Case B was determined to 
be of a commercial type. This determination in turn induced the use of FAR part 12 
acquisition procedures. Part 12 of the FAR requires agencies to use FFP contracts or 
fixed-price contracts with EPA for the acquisition of commercial items. Use of any other 
contract type to acquire commercial items is prohibited by this regulation. A FFP type 
contract was awarded using an indefinite delivery requirements contractual vehicle. 
The budget is very limited for this program. To avoid violating the ADA, 
the contracting officer decided not to use an EPA. Even if the service had not been a 
commercial type, the use of annual 3400 appropriations makes it too risky for the 
government to award any cost type contract. Placement of annual orders using annual 
appropriation helps avoid ADA violations. Further, the nature of a requirements contract 
imposes no obligation on the Government to order any services, which avoids funding 
limitation problems. The basis of consideration for contract formation is the 
government's promise to acquire these services only from the awarded supplier. An ADA 
violation as the result of a termination for convenience is avoided using contractual 
language limiting recover of cost only on orders issued and not on terms earned without 
orders issued. Further, the contract contains an availability of funds clause. 
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The price and service performance requirements were compete for all 15 years to 
comply with CICA. The ceiling amount of the contract includes the entire 15 years. The 
interviewee indicated that without firm pricing for the entire contract period of 
performance the same justification and approval needed to award a sole source contract 
would have to be secured before granting the award term extension. 
The first contracting officer incorporated the SCA into this contract. The award 
of extensions is manually limited to no more than five years at any point in time to avoid 
violating the SCA five-year limitation on the length of the contract. However, the current 
contracting officers understanding is that the SCA does not limit the length of the 
contract to five years. This understanding is based on the DOL interpretation of 
extensions to service contracts. The interviewee provided the DOL interpretation as 
follows: 
Also, whenever the term of an exiting contract is extended, pursuant to an 
option clause or otherwise (e.g. award term provision), so that the 
contractor furnishes the services over and extended period of time, ra ther 
than being granted extra time to fulfill his original commitment, the 
extension is considered to be a new contract for purposes of the 
application of the Act's provisions. (DOL, 1983: 4.143) 
As this was a competitive procurement that was conducted under FAR 12 no 
certified cost and pricing data or information other than cost and pricing data was 
required during source selection. At the time of award of this contract, the government 
was prohibited from requiring certified cost and pricing data under TINA for commercial 
items. However, in Case B no commercial market pricing data was available for this 
service. When pricing contract modifications for this service, it is difficult for the 
contracting officer to determine if the price is fair and reasonable. Because of the 
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potential longer relationship afforded under the award term provision, the buyer and 
supplier negotiated an agreement for the supplier to submit information other than cost or 
pricing data for within scope modifications. The amount of data the supplier provides is 
dependent on the type of change. 
Another regulation that affected this government acquisition included 
consideration of the small business requirements. The regulations required the IPT to 
gain approval from the Small Business Administration not to set-aside the competition to 
small or small disadvantaged businesses. Further, small business/small disadvantage 
business subcontracting plans were required to be submitted and evaluated for non-small 
business offerors.   Because a small business won this competition, the contract does not 
contain a subcontracting plan. As this was not a set-aside, this small business supplier 
does not have to comply with FAR 52.219-14, which would have require the small 
business supplier to perform more than 50% of the effort. 
The contract awarded contains several special clauses or government unique 
terms and conditions. The most notable special clause is an award term clause allowing 
extensions or reductions to the performance period not subject to the Disputes Act. 
Second, a special deliveries and performance clause allowing technical insertion 
upgrades valued up to $50,000 for the first site and $25,000 for all remaining sites within 
the contract price.  Lastly, a system availability accounting clause allows payments to be 
reduced if the system is not 99% available for simulation service. To win the award the 
supplier had to agree to the inclusion of the following government unique contract terms 
and conditions for commercial items under FAR 52.212-4(r )— 
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1. comply with 31 U.S.C. 1352 relating to limitations on the use of appropriated 
funds to influence certain Federal contracts; 
2. 18 U.S.C. 431 relating to officials not to benefit; 
3. 40 U.S.C. 327, et seq., Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act; 
4. 41 U.S.C. 51-58, Anti-Kickback Act of 1986; 
5. 41 U.S.C. 265 and 10 U.S.C. 2409 relating to whistleblower protections; 
6. 49 U.S.C. 40118, Fly American; and 
7. 41 U.S.C. 423 relating to procurement integrity. 
Nature of the DOD Competitive Market. Simulation type training services are 
available commercially. However, mission crew simulation service is not available 
commercially. There were a small number of supplier teams interested in providing the 
mission crew simulation service acquired under Case B. 
There are high start-up costs to enter this market. The supplier must develop, 
integrate interoperability requirements, and produce the devices. The devices must be 
tested before an order for the service is issued. The interviewee indicated the supplier is 
at a tremendous financial risk. No potential supplier in Case B had a competitive edge. 
Shifting the risk of concurrency responsibility to the supplier reduces the potential 
for buy-in. In the past, suppliers have been able to recoup cost through government 
requested change order modifications. Further, pricing the award term extensions reduces 
the potential for buy-in. Previously, suppliers have been able to get well from follow-on 
procurements. 
Acquisition Corps' Capabilities. The interviewee is currently the contracting 
officer/contract negotiator and has participated on the program for one month but works 
the same office with as the prior contracting officer and contract negotiators. This 
participant has two years experience working with award term contracting on another 
procurement. Other related experience in buying services and using ordering contracts, 
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but no experience using commercial procedures. The interviewee indicated that training 
for commercial procedures was needed. Further, the training offered thus far has been 
inadequate because the experience base does not exist in the government. The trainers 
provided have not actually used the prescribed commercial procedures. 
The core government IPT for Case B has experience extreme instability. In the 
two years since the start of acquisition, planning this program has had four different 
contracting officers, two different program managers, three different buyers, and two 
different engineers. Since award of the contract, the TOO for the award term has not 
changed. It was indicated that downsizing required some IPT members to move to other 
inadequately staffed programs. Some IPT members left the program due to promotions 
into open positions left vacant from early retirements. 
The interviewee has provided award term incentive training to the TOO and to the 
supplier. The contracting officer knows the ATRB members are familiar with award fee 
process and believe they understand the award term process because of the similarities. 
CaseC 
Background. This program is for the acquisition of network services. The 
supplier is responsible for providing the network service that links together distributed 
mission training to provide federates with the capability to conduct team training. The 
network service includes integration and interconnectivity services as well as daily 
operations and support. During acquisition planning, the estimated cost of this program 
was $449 million. It was determined the benefits of the relationship exceeded the cost of 
implementing the relationship. The basic contract is for 5 years with 11 annual award 
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term periods that can potentially be earned by the supplier. Based on evaluated 
performance, the supplier can lose up to 2 years, of the original 5 years, for a minimum of 
3 years. Previously earned award term periods may also be lost based on evaluated 
supplier performance. Assigned to the program for 2 years, the contracting officer for this 
case has 15 years of acquisition experience. Assigned to the program for 3 years, the 
contract negotiator for this case has 5 years of contracting experience. Case C's mind 
map is at figure 13 
Nature of the Capability. This network service includes a research and 
development effort for related areas like multi-level security. The supplier establishes the 
standards and tools so those dissimilar platforms can train together. This type of network 
service provides interoperability between different aircraft type of simulators. This 
capability provides a network to connect simulators around the world for real-time 
distributed training. Network services are available commercially and are not unique to 
DOD. The interoperability requirement could not be clearly determined to be of a 
commercial type, as the application is considered unique to DOD. The interoperability 
requirement and the research and development portion of the acquisition caused the team 
to use FAR part 15 procedures to select the supplier. 
The cost of composite training is expensive and dangerous. The network service 
allows the interaction between different platform pilots and between pilots and mission 
crews. Previously we own the simulators with no network training capability. Now 
various suppliers will own, operate, and upgrade concurrency. The network service 








































Figure 13: Case C Open Coded Mind Map 
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that having this network service is very near the core competency of conducting the AF 
mission. 
Legal and Regulatory Environment. The service for Case C was determined to 
be unique to the government. This determination in turn induced the use of FAR part 15 
acquisition procedures. Part 15 of the FAR allows the use of various types of fixed-price 
and cost reimbursement contracts. Using an indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity 
contractual vehicle, the contract awarded for Case C included FFP, not-to exceed (NTE) 
FFP for out year services, time and material (T&M), NTE T&M and cost-plus-fixed-fee 
(CPFF) type pricing arrangements. 
The budget is very limited for this program. Placement of annual orders using 
annual appropriation for the network service will help avoid ADA violations. Further, 
the nature of an ordering contract imposes no obligation on the Government to order any 
effort beyond the required minimum guaranteed, which avoids funding limitation 
problems. The basis of consideration for contract formation is the government's 
placement of the minimum order. An ADA violation as the result of a termination for 
convenience is avoided using the ID/IQ contractual vehicle, which limits recovery to 
issued orders. Further, the contract contains an availability of funds clause. 
To comply with CICA, the acquisition strategy for Case C featured full and open 
competition with a two-phase down select approach FAR 15 procedures. Multiple 
contracts were award. The successful down selected supplier's contract was modified to 
incorporate firm prices for the next five years of services (Phase II) and NTE prices for 
the additional 11 years of potential award term extensions. Because the award terms did 
not include competitively established prices, no extension can be awarded without 
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approval of a sole source award. The IPT for Case C is currently seeking approval of a 
class J&A to definitize the NTE prices from the Secretary of the Air Force Acquisition 
Executive. The class J&A is being requested under the authority of FAR 6.302-1 (a) 
(2)(iii) duplicated cost and unacceptable delay in effort highly specialized service. 
The interviewees indicated that without firm pricing for the entire contract period of 
performance the same justification and approval needed to award a sole source contract 
would have to be secured before granting the award term extension. 
The SCA does not apply to this contract. The DOL does not may wage 
determinations for the professional labor required for this effort. The interviewees 
understanding of the DOL's interpretation of the SCA is that the contract length 
would not be limited to 5 years even if the SCA did apply. 
Adequate competition allowed limited cost and pricing data to be requested 
during the source selection and the down select activities. TINA applies and the 
Government uses certified cost and pricing data for modifications and defmitization of 
the NTE prices. Because technology is changing rapidly, the net cost will continue to 
decline. The NTE prices protected the government and the supplier from locking in firm 
prices too early. A maximum of five years into the future will be definitized. The award 
term plan evaluation incentivizes complete and accurate proposals through rating 
responsiveness to request for proposals. 
Another regulation that affected this government acquisition included 
consideration of the small business requirements. The regulations required the IPT to 
gain approval from the Small Business Administration not to set-aside the competition to 
small or small disadvantaged businesses. A small business and small disadvantage 
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business comprehensive subcontracting plan is included in the contract for Case C. 
Further, the award term plan incentivizes the supplier to exceed socioeconomic program 
goals. 
The contract awarded contains several special clauses or government unique 
terms and conditions. The most notable special clause is an award term clause allowing 
extensions or reductions to the performance period. Case E's award term clause does not 
exempt it from the Disputes Act. A down select clause allows the government to reduce 
the number of suppliers to a single source following the Phase 1 risk reduction effort. A 
special payment procedure similar to performance based payments allows annually priced 
connectivity to be paid monthly. The DOD requirement to use the Defense Information 
Service Network (DISN) as the network architecture has been deferred. The requirement 
will be reviewed after three years of network service at which time the supplier may be 
required to use the DISN network architecture to provide the connectivity service. A 
DISN clause allows the government to direct the supplier to provided the connectivity 
using DISN and allows the change to be negotiate using this clause as the authority. To 
win the award the supplier had to agree to the inclusion of the government unique 
organizational conflict of interest (OCI) clause. This clause is required because the 
supplier for Case C is establishing standards and defines the network interface 
requirements for the other suppliers of simulation services. Further, the network supplier 
can be a technical advisor in future simulation services source selections. 
Nature of the DOD Competitive Market. A large commercial market exists for 
information technology and networking services. The SAMP identifies there are a large 
number of potential offerors interested in this competition. The market is characterized 
116 
by a large number of suppliers varying in size from large businesses to very small 
businesses. 
The network market has few entry barriers and has relatively low start-up cost. 
The performance requirements for Case C are unique to the government and have not 
been previously procured. No potential supplier in Case C had a competitive edge. Full 
and open competition opportunities existed for the initial multiple awarded Phase 1 and 
for the down select single awarded Phase 2. However, the OCI clause caused potential 
offerors not to propose because it would limit future simulation services opportunities. 
The interviewee indicated there was potential for offerors to buy-in for this 
service.   Offerors attempted to move FFP and FFP NTE efforts to the T&M and NTE 
T&M and to the CPFF efforts in their proposed statements of work from the government 
statement of objectives. Numerous evaluation notices were issued and face-to-face 
discussions were conducted during source selection to counteract the buy-in attempts. 
Further, discussion were conducted at the Air Force base and at multiple suppliers' 
facilities during Phase 1 to ensure the task were proposed for Phase 2 under the correct 
contract line items. Further, the NTE pricing with downward only adjustments for the 
award term extensions reduces the potential for buy -in. 
Acquisition Corps' Capabilities. The interviewees were the previous contract 
negotiator and the current contracting officer/contract negotiator for Case C. The 
previous contract negotiator participated on the program for three years and had no prior 
experience buying services, using commercial procedures, or using ordering contracts. 
The current contracting officer/contract negotiator has been working the program for the 
past three years and has experience in buying services and using ordering contracts, but 
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no experience using commercial procedures or using multiple contract types. As the 
award term incentive concept is new, neither of these participates had prior experience in 
its use. 
The core government IPT for Case C has experience extreme instability. In the 
four years since the start of acquisition planning, this program has had two different 
contracting officers, four different program managers, and three different contract 
negotiators. The large staff of five engineers has remained stable. The TDO has not 
changes since the down select to a single supplier. It was indicated that downsizing 
required some IPT members to move to other inadequately staffed programs. Some IPT 
members left the program due to promotions into open positions left vacant from early 
retirements. 
The interviewee has provided award term incentive training to the TDO and to the 
supplier. The contracting officer knows the ATRB members are familiar with award fee 
process and believe they understand the award term process because of the similarities. 
CaseD 
Background. This program is for the acquisition of pilot simulation services 
where the supplier maintains ownership of the system. The supplier is responsible for 
maintaining system concurrency with the aircraft and for all logistics support of the 
system. At the time of acquisition planning, the estimated cost of this program was $605 
million. It was determined the benefits of the relationship exceeded the cost of 
implementing the relationship. The basic contract is for 7 years with 8 annual award term 
periods that can potentially be earned by the supplier for a total of 15 years. Based on 
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evaluated performance, the supplier can lose up to 2 years, of the original 7 years, for a 
minimum of 5 years. Previously earned award term periods may also be lost based on 
evaluated supplier performance. Assigned to the program for 2 years, the contracting 
officer for this case has 16 years of acquisition experience. Case D's mind map is at 
figure 14. 
Nature of the Capability. This program procures availability of pilot training 
simulation services. The simulation service is provided on an individual simulator and is 
linked locally to same aircraft type simulators. The service provides the capability to be 
linked long haul through a network provider to other same aircraft type simulators and to 
be linked long haul through a network provider to different aircraft type simulators. 
These services were determined to be of a commercial type and procured under FAR Part 
12. DOD is currently the only customer of this service. However, there is a potential 
FMS market for this type of simulation service. This is because of the unique training 
required such as flying in formation, air to air tactical mission training, and evasive 
maneuvers. There does not currently exist tactical training except in the aircraft. 
Procuring availability of simulation type training as a service reduces the risk 
associated with training in the aircraft. In fact, some training will be completed solely in 
the simulator because of the high risk of some training the maneuvers in the aircraft or of 
using destructive weapons. Some of the training used to be completed in the aircraft and 




























































Figure 14: Case D Open Coded Mind 
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now we are contracting for the availability of the service. The interviewee indicated that 
having trained pilots to fly missions is near the AF core capability to perform the mission. 
The suppliers have the technical expertise or can hire subject matter experts to 
provide the simulation service. By removing the Government from the process, the 
supplier can implement concurrency upgrades much faster as we no longer have the 
manpower. Further, there was no development and procurement money available to 
maintain concurrency or to meet the new interoperability training requirement. 
Legal and Regulatory Environment. The service for Case D was determined to 
be of a commercial type. This determination in turn induced the use of FAR part 12 
acquisition procedures. Part 12 of the FAR requires agencies to use FFP contracts or 
fixed-price contracts with EPA for the acquisition of commercial items. Use of any other 
contract type to acquire commercial items is prohibited by this regulation. A FFP type 
contract was awarded using an indefinite delivery requirements contractual vehicle. 
The budget is very limited for this program. To avoid violating the ADA, the 
contracting officer decided not to use an EPA. Even if the service had not been a 
commercial type, the use of annual 3400 appropriations makes it too risky for the 
government to award any cost type contract. Placement of annual orders using annual 
appropriation helps avoid ADA violations. Further, the nature of a requirements contract 
imposes no obligation on the Government to order any services, which avoids funding 
limitation problems. The basis of consideration for contract formation is the 
government's promise to acquire these services only from the awarded supplier. An ADA 
violation as the result of a termination for convenience is avoided using contractual 
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language limiting recover of cost only on orders issued and not on terms earned without 
orders issued. Further, the contract contains an availability of funds clause. 
To comply with CICA, the Case D synopsized and competed the service 
performance requirements for all 15 years. The ceiling amount of the contract includes 
the entire 15 years. The interviewee indicated that without firm pricing for the entire 
contract period of performance the same justification and approval needed to award a 
sole source contract would have to be secured before granting the award term extension. 
The acquisition planning for this program includes the application of the SCA, 
which provides for wage adjustments and limits the contract to five years. Price 
adjustments will be made based on union negotiate rates for the technicians. The IPT is 
mechanically controlling the total length of the award term extensions that are on contract 
at any point in time. There will never be more than five years of performance on contract 
at anyone time. As years of performance are used up then more are added or subtracted 
base on evaluation of supplier performance. This was coordinated with the AFMC 
Department of Labor (DOL) Liaison Representative and the Secretary of the Air Force 
Staff Judge Advocate Generals (SAF/JAG) office. 
As this was a competitive procurement that was conducted under FAR 12 no 
certified cost and pricing data or information other than cost and pricing data was 
required during source selection. At the time of award of this contract, the government 
was prohibited from requiring certified cost and pricing data under TINA for commercial 
items. However, in Case D no commercial market pricing data was available for this 
service. When pricing contract modifications for this service, it is difficult for the 
contracting officer to determine if the price is fair and reasonable. Because of the 
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potential longer relationship afforded under the award term provision, the supplier has 
voluntarily provided other than cost and pricing data as well as catalogue data if available 
to help support the changes process. 
Another regulation that affected this government acquisition included 
consideration of the small business requirements. The regulations required the IPT to 
gain approval from the Small Business Administration not to set-aside the competition to 
small or small disadvantaged businesses. Further, small business/small disadvantage 
business subcontracting plans were required to be submitted, evaluated, and 
administered. 
The contract awarded contains several special clauses or government unique 
terms and conditions. The most notable special clause is an award term clause allowing 
extensions or reductions to the performance period not subject to the Disputes Act. 
Second, a special deliveries and performance clause allowing technical insertion 
upgrades. Lastly, a system availability accounting clause allowing assignment of award 
term points for mean time between failure and the device availability rates that feeds into 
the performance evaluation of the award term for system availability. To win the award 
the supplier had to agree to the inclusion of the following government unique contract 
terms and conditions for commercial items under FAR 52.212-4(r )— 
1. comply with 31 U.S.C. 1352 relating to limitations on the use of appropriated 
funds to influence certain Federal contracts; 
2. 18 U.S.C. 431 relating to officials not to benefit; 
3. 40 U.S.C. 327, et seq., Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act; 
4. 41 U.S.C. 51-58, Anti-Kickback Act of 1986; 
5. 41 U.S.C. 265 and 10 U.S.C. 2409 relating to whistleblower protections; 
6. 49 U.S.C. 40118, Fly American; and 
7. 41 U.S.C. 423 relating to procurement integrity. 
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Nature of the DOD Competitive Market._ Pilot simulation training service for 
commercial airlines can be acquired on an hourly basis. The number of suppliers of pilot 
training in the commercial market is small because of the FAA certification and annual 
re-certification requirements. The number of suppliers for the simulation service 
acquired under Case D contained a few of the large DOD contractors. The AF certifies 
AF owned devices for training. The AF will remain the certification authority for the 
simulators that will provide the service acquired for Case D. 
There are high start-up costs to enter this market. The supplier must develop, 
integrate interoperability requirements, and produce the devices. The devices must be 
tested and certified before an order for the service is issued. Commercial suppliers are 
guaranteed a revenue stream for the simulation service. Appropriation law does not allow 
us this latitude. The interviewee indicated the supplier is at a tremendous financial risk. 
The supplier in Case D did have a competitive edge because they are the producer 
of the aircraft and have produced this type of simulator in the past. As the producer of the 
aircraft, the supplier will be able to maintain concurrency with the aircraft easier than 
another supplier could. 
Shifting the risk of concurrency responsibility to the supplier reduces the potential 
for buy-in. In the past, suppliers have been able to recoup cost through government 
requested change order modifications. Further, pricing the award term extensions reduces 
the potential for buy-in. Previously, suppliers have been able to get well from follow-on 
procurements. 
Acquisition Corps' Capabilities. The interviewee was the contract negotiator 
before contract award and is currently the contracting officer/contract negotiator for Case 
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D.   This participant has been working the program for two years and had no prior 
experience buying services, using commercial procedures, or using ordering contracts. 
The participant had no experience using award term, as this is a new concept. 
The core government IPT for Case D experienced some instability. From the 
stare of the program two years ago, this program has had two different contracting 
officers, two different program managers, two different contract negotiators, and two 
different engineers. Since award of the contract, the Term Determining Official (TDO) 
for the award term has changed twice. It was indicated that downsizing required some 
IPT members to move to other inadequately staffed programs. Some IPT members left 
the program due to promotions into open positions left vacant from early retirements. 
The interviewee has not received or conducted training for the award term 
concept and related acquisition concepts other than the award term plan for the contract. 
Each of the TDO changes requires training of duties and responsibilities concerning the 
award term process, but was provided by another IPT. The Award Term Review Board 
(ATRB) members are assumed to understand the award term process, as they are familiar 
with the award fee process. 
CaseE 
Background. This program is for the acquisition of aircraft engine overhaul and 
repair services. The supplier is responsible for scheduled overhaul maintenance and for 
diagnoses and repair. At the time of contract award, the estimated cost of this program 
was $10 billion. It was determined the benefits of the relationship exceeded the cost of 
implementing the relationship. The basic contract is for 7 years with 8 annual award term 
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periods that can potentially be earned by the supplier for a total of 15 years. Based on 
evaluated performance, the supplier can lose up to 2 years, of the original 7 years, for a 
minimum of 5 years. Previously earned award term periods may also be lost based on 
evaluated supplier performance. Assigned to the program for 4 years, the contracting 
officer for this case has 28 years of acquisition experience. Case E's mind map is at 
figure 15. 
Nature of the Capability. This program is for the procurement of aircraft engine 
overhaul and repair services. The service includes scheduled maintenance, diagnostic 
efforts, and repair of inoperable equipment for three different types of engines. Two of 
the types of engine overhaul and repair services are available commercially. One of the 
types of engine overhaul and repair service is not available commercially, but the service 
was determined to be of a commercial type. 
This capability was previously provided by an AF Air Logistic Center that was 
closed under the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Act of 1995. This service was 
considered for outsourcing as the act provided for a public/ private competition. 
Therefore, the supplier selection and evaluation processes followed FAR part 12 for 
private offerers and resembled a FAR part 15 for the public offerer team. 
The capability of maintaining and repairing weapon system and airlift systems 
engines was considered by the acquisition team to be near the AF core mission. The 
service in critical to supporting two near simultaneous regional conflicts. 
Legal and Regulatory Environment. The service for Case E was determined to 
be of a commercial type. This determination in turn induced the use of FAR part 12 
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Figure 15: Case E Open Coded Mind Map 
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FFP contracts or fixed-price contracts with EPA for the acquisition of commercial items. 
However, the public offeror was required to submit cost and pricing data with no profit 
for the public offeror. In an attempt to maintain the spirit of commercial acquisition, a FP 
(no profit) with EPA type contract was awarded to the public offeror using an indefinite 
delivery requirements contractual vehicle. The public supplier of this effort issued a FFP 
with EPA type contract to their industry team member 
The ADA does not apply to the public offeror, but does apply to the 
private team member. The use of annual 3400 appropriations makes it too risky for the 
government to award any cost type contract. Placement of annual orders using annual 
appropriation helps avoid ADA violations. The basis of consideration for contract 
formation is the government's promise to acquire these services only from the awarded 
supplier. The nature of a requirements contract imposes no obligation on the government 
to order a minimum amount of services. No special termination for convenience language 
was included excluding cost incurred to earn award terms. The contract contains an 
availability of funds clause. However, special provision was included to guarantee the 
supplier team five years of workload. If the contract team was terminated before the end 
of five years of orders, the government may incur a termination liability from the 
supplier's private teammate. As Case E's contract is funded with a 3400 annual 
appropriation, this could lead to an ADA violation. 
To comply with CICA, the IPT for Case E synopsized and competed the service 
performance requirements for all 15 years. The ceiling amount of the contract includes 
the entire 15 years. The interviewee indicated that without firm pricing for the entire 
contract period of performance the same justification and approval needed to award a 
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sole source contract would have to be secured before granting the award term extension. 
The interviewee noted that if this were not a government procurement, offerors would not 
be required to provide prices now to establish the long-term relationship. 
The SCA does not apply to repair and overhaul. The AFMC FAR supplement 
considers engine overhaul programs to be of the scope of a rebuilding or of a 
reconditioning effort that constitutes a re-manufacturing effort. Re-manufacturing efforts 
are not covered by the SCA. 
As this was a competitive procurement that was conducted under FAR 12 no 
certified cost and pricing data or information other than cost and pricing data was 
required from any private offeror during source selection. TINA did not apply to the 
public offeror during source selection or after award. However, in Case E commercial 
market pricing data and historical cost data was available for this service. Because the 
supplier is public provider, requests for equitable adjustment are substantiate with 
information other than cost or pricing data. 
Another regulation that affected this government acquisition included 
consideration of the small business requirements. Because the BRAC Act of 1995 
directed this public/private competition, the SBA did not consider the effort for set-aside. 
Small business/small disadvantage business subcontracting plans were required to be 
submitted, evaluated, and administered. 
The contract awarded contains several special clauses or government unique 
terms and conditions. The most notable special clause is an award term clause allowing 
extensions or reductions to the performance period not subject to the Disputes Act. The 
EPA clause allows downward only price adjustments. A workload volume guarantee 
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clause allows supplier to submit REA if the volume changes greater than plus or minus 
25%. A clause notifies the supplier, at its own risk, it can induct and repair an item before 
the issuance of an order. 
Nature of the DOD Competitive Market. This type of engine overhaul and 
repair service is commercially available. The number of license issued by the original 
equipment manufacturer limits the number of commercial suppliers. Only one public 
offeror was identified in the BRAC Act of 1995. Potentially numerous private suppliers 
could have competed for this service. All of the potential private suppliers were DOD 
contractors. Most suppliers develop teaming arrangements. According to the 
interviewee, some potential offerors dropped out of the competition due to the high cost 
of proposing or on the belief they would not be competitive. The winner was the public 
offeror with a major weapon systems manufacturer as a partner. 
The interviewee contends no offeror had a technical competitive advantage over 
other offerors. However, one offeror a team included several original equipment 
manufacturers and another team included with licensed equipment maintenance 
members. Government furnished equipment and facilities were offered to all. All 
suppliers were provided access to hire experienced government employees. 
The interviewee believes the long-term nature of the award term incentive 
concept reduces the potential for buy-in. Previously, suppliers have been able to get well 
from follow-on contracts. The FFP with downward only EPA contract type further 
reduced the potential for buy-in. 
Acquisition Corps' Capabilities., The interviewee was the contracting officer for 
three years before award and one year after award for Case E. This participant has prior 
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experience buying services, using commercial procedures, and using ordering contracts. 
As the award term incentive concept is new, the participant did not have any experience 
using award term. 
The core government IPT for Case E was very stable for the three years before 
award. Members of the IPT were denied special training opportunities and job rotations 
in order to maintain team cohesiveness for the largest contract using the new award term 
contract. Shortly following award of the contract, the IPT experienced 100% turnover of 
the team membership. This was due to permanent change of station assignments, long 
term school attendance, and job reassignments. The current IPT will soon see another 
dramatic turnover of personnel because the base is closing and some team members will 
not move to the new base that will be administering the program activities. The TDO for 
the award term has not changed. Another chairperson of the ATRB will be assigned 
when the program administration activities are moved to the new base. 
The interviewee has not received or conducted formal training for the award term 
concept. Example documents have been provided to Navy and Army acquisition 
professional. Award term evaluation training was conducted with the EPT, the 
administrative contracting officer, and the customers. 
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